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Abstract 
Though the pregnant woman usually wants her foetus to be bom a heahhy child, 
and though she usually concurs with the physician as to the best method by 
which to attain this goal, there are circumstances when their goals and wishes 
will not concur. Due to the recent 'reproduction revolution', the foetus is now 
treatable in a multitude of circumstances and is no longer a mysterious entity 
whose protection lies solely in the hands of God or chance. Therefore, a 
possible conflict of interests arises between the physician or the government, 
who may have the interest of the foetus at heart (due to their interest in the 
sanctity of life) and the pregnant woman, who may have her interest in freedom 
from unwanted bodily intrusion at heart. 
Gerald Dworkin's theory of autonomy is compared to other theories of 
liberty and autonomy, and is favoured for its legal applicability and then applied 
to the scenario of the pregnant woman. The thesis aims to legally regulate the 
conflict of interests recommending that out of a concern for her individual 
autonomy, the pregnant woman should at no point be forced into unwanted 
bodily intervention. On the other hand, it is recommended that her right to 
demand treatment on her own behalf, or on behalf of the foetus should be made 
subject to governmental control due to the potential of the foetus to becorne 
human, and due to its human origins. However, the pregnant woman will still 
retain some protection due to the inequality with other woman that would 
otherwise arise. 
It is with the most recent technologies that this thesis proves most 
important, for the possibilities of genetically or cosmetically altering the foetus 
are increasing, and it is important that the law controls such treatments to 
prevent the trampling of rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many commentators have deliberated over the ethical status of the foetus' and 
found that the arguments are so subjective as to be futile. Here the status of the 
woman is concentrated on, for she is an entity which we are more capable of 
knowing and understanding. As John Eekelaar says: 
"Rather than determining what a woman's duties should be on the basis 
of whether or not a foetus has rights, it might be more fruitful to 
inquire what duties social morality requires of the mother (and others) 
towards the unborn ... by focusing on the mother, not the foetus it 
becomes possible to relate the choices before her and their effects on 
her to analogous situations and in this way to construct a coherent 
moral framework."^ 
However, though it is the status of the pregnant woman that we wish to 
determine, in the final chapter deliberation on the status of the foetus is added to 
test and add to the conclusions made about the pregnant woman. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to examine morality and ethics in a 
vacuum, but rather to consider principles with a view to their application in 
present English law. It is for this reason that discussion of abortion is largely 
avoided. Abortion has been discussed many times before and the more recent 
technological innovations and their impact on the pregnant woman must be 
considered in order to prepare the law for their common application. The new 
methods of screening the pregnant woman to diagnose foetal abnormalities and 
the growing range of treatments that are available for foetal illnesses (be they in 
the form of maternal diet, drug administration or surgery) are discussed and the 
new dimensions that they add to the debate over the status of the foetus are 
considered. 
'. Whenever the term foetus' is used it shall be taken to include all the stages of cnibrj'onic 
development from implantation in the womb to birth. 
John Eekelaar Does a Mollier have Legal Duties to her Unborn Child?' in Peter Byrne (ed.) Health. 
Rights and Resources: Kinti's Colleac Studies 1987-8 (London: 0.\ford University Press. 1988), 55 at 
58. 
The above treatments of the foetus are similar in that in order to treat the 
foetus, the woman must first be touched. As any hostile touching constitutes a 
battery, the woman's consent must be obtained before they are carried out. 
However, the recent case of Re S (adult refusal of medical treatment)^ throws 
her right to decline that consent into confiision. In Re S a pregnant woman 
declined to consent to a caesarean section operation which was needed to save 
both the foetus and herself A court order was obtained and the operation went 
ahead regardless of her refiisal to consent. 
Perhaps it is the recent technological advances, making the foetus more 
treatable and therefore increasingly perceivable as a patient by the physician'', 
that has nurtured the Re S scenario. For there has recently been a reproduction 
revolution^ and legal response to the progression has been inadequate. 
Philosophers have broached the subject, as have legal commentators and 
theologists and there is no general consensus regarding a solution to the 
problems created by the revolution. 
The technological advances are evident in methods of screening, in 
prenatal diagnosis, in correction of foetal deformities (from drug therapy to 
foetal surgery*") and in the birthing process. It is important that we view the 
reproduction revolution in a way that will provide a sound legal basis that is of 
practical use to society. Some say that philosophical analysis leads us no-where^. 
This is not only defeatist, but is also irresponsible. The law needs to be 
3 [1992] 3 W L R 806. 
Whenever the word 'physician' is used, it shall be taken to refer to any member of the health team 
responsible for the care of pregnant woman and foetus (or of the patient in general). 
". See S.L. Barron and D.F. Roberts (eds.) Issues in Fetal Medicine. Proceedings of the 29th Annual 
Symposium of the Galton Institute. London 1992 (London and New York: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1995). 
For an analysis of the surgical considerations involved in foetal surgen. see M R. Harrison, and S. 
Adzick 'The Fetus as a Patient: Surgical Considerations' Annals Suraep.' 213 (March 1991), 277. 
Michael Harrison pioneered foetal surger>'. 
\ Sec Patricia King. "The Judicial Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the 
Unborn' (1979) 77(2) Michigan Law Review 1647. Here King relies on a biological rather than 
philosophical rationale for protecting the foetus; she believes that the foetus descr\'es protection once 
viable. 
legitimate in the eyes of the majority and this can only be achieved through valid 
philosophical appraisal of provisions before they become law. The reproduction 
revolution must be monitored, confined or expanded by the law and the law 
must be formulated with due reference to morality and justice. 
The pregnant woman has many options regarding detection, correction or 
termination of her defective foetus. The foetus was once a medical mystery; a 
part of the woman that could not be controlled. Now, however, we are far 
better equipped to deal with the variety of events which occur during pregnancy 
/ / the pregnant woman consents to the procedure in question. The trouble arises 
when she refuses that consent. She may reflise it out of a desire to injure the 
baby, but this is in the main part unrealistic^ Usually, her reasons for refusing 
intervention will concern her religious beliefs or her fear of surgeons; in short 
her primary aim will be to protect the foetus. I f her belief is ignorant, should she 
be forced to undergo the intervention? Perhaps she would even thank the doctor 
when the baby is saved as a result of that forced intervention. Alternatively, 
should she be left to decide these issues for herself? How paternalistic should the 
state be in this area? 
Great Britain is democratic and supports a liberal rationale and at present 
individuals are largely protected from forced medical intervention by the 
doctrines of informed consent and the remedy of battery. However, there is an 
ever present danger that the problems arising from the reproduction revolution 
are remedied in a way similar to that of the United States. There, caesarean 
section operations have been ordered by the courts against the will of the 
woman^, and women have been subject to criminal liabilities for neglect of their 
unborn children. There are already signs that English law is following the same 
However, see Liebernian, Mazor, Chaini and Cohen in T h e Foetal Riglit to Live' Obstetrics and 
Gvnaecolog.v 53 (1979), 515 at 515: They say "It is probable that the patient hopes to be freed in this 
way (i.e. by refusing intcr\ ention) of an undesired pregnancy and in no case will the patient share her 
secret thought with the physician." . 
See V . E . Kolder. J. Gallagher and M.T. Parsons 'Court Ordered Obstetric lnler\'entions' New 
England Journal of Medicine 316 (1987), 1192; R. Jurrow and R.H. Paul ''Caesarean Deliver,' for 
Fetal Distress without Maternal Consent" Obstetrics and Gynaecology 63 (1984), 596; and W.A. 
Bo\ycs and B. Selegested 'Foetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal perspectives' 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 58 (1981), 209. 
course, as was shown in Re S The aim of the thesis is to show the error of this 
legal directiori and to attempt to recommend a more acceptable course. 
This is achieved undeir the rationale of the autonomy principle. Valuing an 
individual's autonomy can be roughly equated to valuing an individual's self-
determination. This is a principle that has been much iised and much abused in 
the past and has as a result lost favour. It is suggested that the reason for this 
loss of favour is that the autonomy principle has been blurred. The first chapter 
comprises a reappraisal of the autonomy principle and sharpens and refines the 
definition of autonomy enabling its application to the case of the pregnant 
woman. Much use is made of Gerald Dworkin's theory of autDnomy'" for he 
recognises that a person need not be totally uninfluenced in order to be 
autonomous provided that his action is a product of his weighing up of his 
personal preferences. This theory is compared with other theories and favoured 
because of its legal applicability and sound philosophical base. 
Once the principle of autonomy has been examined, it is applied to the case of 
the pregnant woman, with regard to the recent technological advances in foetal 
diagnosis and treatment. It is suggested that autonomy is important enough for 
us to protect the pregnant woman's absolute right to refiise treatment. In the 
third chapter, however^ I suggest that other values, such as patient well-being 
and other factors, such as resource allocation, mean that the autonomy principle 
cannot always be cited in defence of the pregnant woman's right to demand 
treatment for herself or her foetus. The distinction between demanding and 
refiising treatment is crucial. The intrinsic value of autonomy requires that we 
respect all competent individual's wishes concerning refijsal of treatment even if 
their own life, or, that of the foetus is endangered or lost as a resuU. However, 
the third chapter identifies society's interest in the foetus as a potential human 
being and of human origin. Because of its importance to society, the pregnant 
" \ Found largely in his book The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
woman's right to demand treatment, such as abortion or surgery should only be 
acquiesced after weighing up the harm caused to woman and foetus. 
This is not to say that the woman should always be refused treatment that 
may harm her foetus. At no point should the woman be refijsed any treatment 
that an unpregnant woman would be allowed, hence a woman that would be 
offered radiotherapy for cancer should not be refijsed it on the grounds that she 
is pregnant and her foetus would be harmed. Further, the importance of the 
foetus will not necessarily outweigh the importance of the health of the woman, 
and the present abortion laws reflect this factor. However, there will be 
circumstances when abortion will be refused, or foetal surgery or treatment" 
will be refused on the grounds that the foetus is important to society and so the 
woman's demands must be limited and her autonomy curtailed. This is 
particularly apparent with the new technologies. 
Hence her right to refuse a caesarean section operation or foetal surgery 
that will save the foetus (or even her own life) is sacrosanct. This applies whether 
or not the foetus will be harmed by her refusal; regardless of the expense caused 
to society by the production of a handicapped child; regardless of the symbolic 
affect of the death of a viable foetus; and regardless of the economic effect of a 
refusal to consent that results in more expensive treatment at a later date. 
However, her right to demand treatment such as screening, surgery or abortion 
whether it be on behalf of the foetus or on her own behalf can, I submit, 
legitimately be limited by the state, and indeed must be limited by the state for 
the good of society. 
It is possible to envisage foetal treatment or surgery that is not in the best interests of the foetus as 
will be seen in chapter three. For example the altering of the cosmetic appearance of the foetus. 
1. AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to define autonomy and to enable an application of the 
principle to the case of the pregnant woman. The intention is not merely to 
deliberate on the moral ambits of autonomy but to derive a legally applicable 
definition of autonomy for present day England and Wales. The definition of 
autonomy must be generally applicable, for a definition of a general term that is 
subject specific is liable to criticism. 
To sum up a word such as autonomy one may call it 'self-government' for 
the etymology of the word implies as much.' However, autonomy is far more 
complicated than this may suggest. It is a term of art and can be divided in many 
ways: in terms of its application (be it state or individual autonomy) or in terms 
of its ambits (be it a subjective or objective definition). On the widest level, we 
use our autonomy to appoint a government that it might take over a part of our 
autonomy for the good of the whole, a type of agency. On a smaller scale, it is 
the right of individuals to be free from governmental interference in certain areas 
of their lives. On the smallest scale it is the right of every individual to choose 
how to act in a given situation. 
Various commentators have worked on the definition of autonomy. These 
commentators can largely be classified into two groups, those who propose a 
'negative liberty' stance, and those who propose a 'positive liberty' stance. 
Both these groups are examined and rejected in. favour of a contemporary theory 
of autonomy by Gerald Dworkin due to the practical applicability of his theory. 
What is an autonomous act? Am I autonomous in my every action because 
I always have an element of choice? Am I never autonomous because there are 
always constraints such as the government, my family or my peers fettering my 
freedom of choice? Is autonomy somewhere in the middle? It may be that there 
is no correct definition of the term because it is used in such a variety of 
'. G Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 1988) at 108: "The,central idea thai underlies the concept of autonomy is 
indicated by the etymology of the term; aulo.'i (self) nonio.s (rule or law)." 
situations. However, it is the aim of this chapter to .expound the virtues of 
Gerald Dworkin's definition and discount the positive and negative liberty 
standpoints. The definition of autonomy will be used in the following chapters 
to suggest when and how the pregnant woman's right to refijse treatment and 
her right to demand treatment should be heeded. 
The Difference Between State and individual Autonomy 
It is important to note from the start that it is not only individuals who can be 
aittonomous. So too may the government, thereby limiting the. individuals 
autonomy. However 'state'^ and 'individual' autonomy are closely related: 
"The autonomous person (like the autonomous state) must not be 
subject to external interference or control but must, rather freely 
direct and govern the course of his (or her) own life."^ 
Disparity can clearly be contemplated, for state and individual autonomy will 
inevitably come into occasional opposition. The state is autonomous if it acts 
without the control of another state, but it must also remain within the rules set 
by the people to which it owes its autonomy. In Great Britain there is a 
democracy, and were that democratic element to be lost the legitimacy of the 
state autoiiomy would be called into question. 
Protection of the individual's autonomy is also found in the fact that laws 
are made not merely on political whims, but on the basis of morals. The legal 
philosopher attempts to aid the creation of laws by debating the rights and 
wrongs of a given situation. In debating the ambits of 'autonomy', the law can 
be guided so that it encroaches on the individual's autonomy (or protects that 
autonomy) to a rational extent. Hence the government will wish to interfere with 
an individual's autonomy only when it is morally correct to do so. In chapter 
two, it is proposed that it is unacceptable for the government to interfere with 
the individual's right to refijse medical treatment, largely due to the importance 
-. 'State autonomy' is synonymous with 'governmental autonomy". 
\ Robert Young Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1986). 1. 
of individual autonomy and in"-chapter three it is proposed that limiting the 
individual's right to deinand treatment is an acceptable infringement of his 
autonomy in certain sitiiations 
Positive and Negative Freedom 
First, however, the ambits of positive and negative freedom are examined. 
Rather than defining the ambits of state autonomy, we will look froin the other 
side of the picture, at individual autonomy, for it is the individual pregnant 
woman with which we are concerned. The commentary on this subject has long 
been taking place, and not always under the specific name of 'autonomy' which 
is a relatively new term. Instead, many have referred to 'liberty' or 'freedom' 
and as it is only recently that autonomy has been separated form these terms, 
some of the older theories on liberty contribute to the debate. Two themes of 
liberty run throughout the philosophical thinking. These are termed 'negative 
liberty' and 'positive liberty'. The former is the view that liberty or freedom 
constitutes firstly a lack of constraint, and secondly a willingness to consider the 
options available. The latter view demands much more of an individual before he 
is to be considered free, or at liberty. Autonomy has to be placed within this 
debate. 
Even though it is proposed that autonomy must be separated from these 
concepts, it is usefijl to place the term 'autonomy' in relation to them. It is also 
clear that liberty and freedom in their own right will be of great importance 
when defining the limits of the pregnant woman's rights in relation to her foetus. 
a) The 'Negative Theory' 
The debate that the following commentators are concerned with, is whether 
freedom is positive or negative; the debate that we are concerned with, is 
whether or not we can separate freedom and autonomy by this very positive / 
negative distinction, so in fact our purposes are very similar. Hence, the fact 
that the philosophers debated only the issue of freedom will not preclude us 
from, firstly drawing conclusions as to the nature of autonomy, and secondly 
from drawing a distinction between autonomy and freedom. 
10 
There are many variations on the negative theory, some of which will be 
discussed below. As a general definition,. however, Milne describes the 
negative theory in the following terms: "You are free or at liberty to the extent 
that you are not subject to constraint in the shape of compulsion, coercion or 
interference by any other human being. 
i) J.S. Mill 
J.S. Mill worked extensively on the definition of liberty or freedom and is a 
negative liberty theorist. However, unlike the pure definition that is given in the 
above section, he embellishes the theory in that he demands certain features of 
society before he will consider it to comprise of free individuals. For example, 
he believes that freedom of speech is a necessary constituent. 
miat constitutes a society of free individuals? 
Mill claims that in a civilised society, liberty can only be interfered with in the 
prevention of harm to others. In other words a person should not be constrained 
for his own good: 
"The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our 
own good in our own way so long as we do not attempt to deprive 
others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper 
guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. 
Mankind are the greater gainers by suffering each other to live as 
seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems 
good to the rest."^ 
Therefore, for Mill, a society could not be called free if it were to force a 
pregnant woman to undergo surgery for the purpose of saving her life, or saving 
the life of the foetus for the sole reason that the woman would later be gratefiil, 
because freedom is incompatible with constraint for the 'good' of an individual.^ 
^ A.J .M. Milne Freedom and Rights (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. New York: 
Humanities Press Inc., 1968). 17. 
J.S. Mill On Liberty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946). 
See also Sir Isaiah Berlin, page 16. 
11 
For Mill, a society is free i f that freedom exists in procedural terms. Scanlon 
defends Mill's view in the following terms: 
" I will defend the Millian principle by showing it to be a consequence 
of the view that the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens 
could recognise while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, 
rational agents."^ 
Hence Mill allows constraint only on the grounds of prevention of harm to 
others. It must be fair constraint organised by the government. Therefore, i f we 
were to decide that the foetus constitutes 'another' then Mill would object to its 
being harmed for the sake of the woman's freedom. Mill is a utilitarian, in 
other words he believes in the securing of the greatest amount of happiness 
among the greatest possible numbers of people, within his definition of freedom. 
WItat constitutes a free individual? 
For an individual to be autonomous, Scanlon says: 
"To regard himself as autonomous in the sense I have in mind, a person 
must see himself as sovereign in deciding what to believe and in 
weighing competing reasons for action."^ 
And later. 
"What is essential to the person's remaining autonomous is that in any 
given case his mere recognition that a certain action is required by law 
does not settle the question of whether he will do it ,"^ 
Hence, his autonomy is not secured merely by there being a law that grants him 
freedom in a particular instance. What is needed is an actual freedom of the 
mind: a questioning of any given fact and acting accordingly. I f a person were to 
\ Thomas Scanlon "A theory of.freedom of expression" (Winter 1972) I Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 215, 
^ Thomas Scanlon ibid.. 
'\ Thomas Scanlon ibid.. 
12 
act wholly without thinking, he would not be acting autonomously. In this way, 
the pregnant woman cannot claim to be autonomous merely because she chooses 
one of the limited options granted by the physician, she must look deeply at her 
own preferences and decide on a course of action accordingly. To be told that 
she can choose amniocentesis or merely endure a scan does not make her 
autonomous in her choice of a scan i f she really does not desire either of the 
screening methods. 
ii) Maurice Cranston 
Cranston''' is a negative theorist in the purest form for he believes that any 
society in which there is wide agreement is considered free, regardless of the 
political ideals within that society. He does not believe that freedom is best 
preserved through a total lack of constraint Instead, he sees it as a society 
which governs its people according to two considerations (as outlined by 
Milne"): 
1. That (constraint) is never used except to enforce obedience to orders and rules 
which in social contexts have either a pragmatic or substantive justification. 
2. That it should be exercised to compel obedience to such rules and orders only 
when there is a net advantage to the life of the society in doing so. 
In short, there must be wide agreement within society for it to be free. 
Cranston rejects the positive theory on linguistic grounds, believing that the 
word 'freedom' ought to be construed in a way that it would be used by society, 
rather than in a specialised manner 
iii) Sir Isaiah Berlin 
Berlin,''^ like Cranston, is a contemporary negative theorist, but Milne notes 
that rather than criticising the positive view on the basis of its linguistic 
inaccessibility to the populous (as is Cranston's method), he adopts the 
theoretically more satisfactory standpoint of basing his criticism on substantive 
Freedom, a New Analysis (London: Longman Green and Co., 1953). 
". Milne op. cit., 145. 
'". Tyyo Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). 
13 
g r o u n d s . L i k e Mi l l , he views lack o f governmental interference as constituting 
greater freedom. 
What constitutes a society of free individuals? 
According to Berlin, no society is free unless it accords to two interrelated 
principles: 
"First that no power but only rights can be regarded as absolute so 
that all men whatever power governs them, have an absolute right to 
refuse to behave inhumanely; and second that there are frontiers not 
artificially drawn within which men should be inviolable, these 
frontiers being defined in terms o f rules so long and widely accepted 
that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is 
to be a normal human being and therefore also o f what it is to act 
inhumanely and insanely, rules o f which it would be absurd to say for 
example, that they could be abrogated by some formal procedure on 
the part o f some court o f sovereign body."''* 
So men in a free society should be governed only by accepted principles and 
rules and no rule should demand inhumane behaviour o f the individual. 
Presumably,, what is 'inhumane' is for the individual to decide. This principle is 
recognised in the medical arena, in that physicians may object to courses of 
action to which they are morally opposed, provided that they refer the patient 
to another physician. The same could be argued on the behalf o f the pregnant 
woman; that i f she feels that a course o f treatment is inhumane then she should 
to able to refijse to take any part in it, and as interference with the foetus 
inevitably necessitates interference with the woman, she would be able to veto 
any proposed foetal treatment. 
' \ Milne op: cil., 32. 
Sir Isaiah Berlin Two Concepts of Liberty op. cil. 54.. 
However, there could be difTicultics with this line in that Ihe pregnant woman may feel that 
she is behax ing inhumanely if she does not abort the foetus. English laws restrict abortion in 
certain circumstances for extremely valid reasons. My thesis that there should be a perceived 
difference between the right to refuse treatment (which is sacrosanct) and the right to demand 
it (which is limitable by the government) would solve this difficulty. 
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fVliat constitutes a free individual? 
Berlin sees freedom of choice as the key to individual freedom:'^ 
"The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which 
we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the 
realisation o f some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice o f 
others. Indeed it is because this is their situation that men place such 
immense value on the freedom to choose."'^ 
He criticises the positive theory for leading too easily to the conclusion that 
people are not being coerced i f they are coerced for their own good. The self, 
he believes, is not a metaphysical concept: It does not comprise of two 
elements: the natural side and the rational side. A person, he believes, cannot 
be split into two in this manner. Such a splitting o f the person leads the positive 
theorists into thinking that i f only the rational side o f the personality could 
overcome the natural side, then people would voluntarily do what they are being 
forced to do. In this way they see such a coerced individual as truly free. Berlin 
prefers the negative theory because it recognises the individual's ability to choose 
and the importance o f that ability. 
b) The 'Positive Theory' 
The positive theory demands more o f the individual before he is considered free 
or at liberty. Milne characterises it in the following way: " I wish above all to be 
conscious o f myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility 
for my choices 
i) Green 
T.H. Green contrasts: 
"... the man who directs his life on the basis of rational moral 
convictions with the man who is content to allow his inclinations of the 
But sec chapter two, page 47. 
''. Berlin ibid. 5,' 
Mihie op. cit.. 36. 
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moment and his desire for personal enjoyment to be his guide without 
considering his personal well-being on the whole or his responsibilities 
to others. In one sense both are equally free for each is equally the 
author o f his actions and is free from compulsion by others. But in 
another sense the former is free while the latter is not, for he is at the 
mercy o f his inclinations and desires." 
For Green freedom is dependant upon rationality, whereas for the negative 
theorists the most important factor in freedom is the lack o f res t ra in t .Hence 
only a rational decision by a pregnant woman would be considered a free 
decision. 
ii) Bosanquet 
Bernard Bosanquet contends that one is free to the extent that one achieves real 
selfhood. In its turn, real selfhood is achieved to the extent that one is a rational 
moral agent. For him, liberty is something to be achieved; we do not start with 
liberty which is gradually curbed by the state; other individuals are equally adept 
at reducing the liberty o f a man: 
"To become fully ourselves, we must become all that we have in us to 
be. In order to be ourselves, we must always be becoming something 
which we are not, liberty as the' condition o f being ourselves cannot 
simply be something which we have, still less something which we 
have always has ... It must be a condition relevant to our continuous 
struggle to assert the control o f something in us which we recognise 
as imperative upon us or as our true self but which we obey only in a 
very imperfect degree."^' 
Milne later sums up the positive theory according to Green and Bosanquet in the 
following manner: 
" ... its central thought may be summed up in the proposition that 
rational moral conduct, self-realisation, and freedom are co-extensive. 
See Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligations (London: Longman Green and Co., 
1941),.! 
According to Milne (op. cit., 21), versions of this theory were put fonvard by Rousseau, 
Kant and Hegal before Bosanquet restated the theory. 
"'. Bosanquet The Philosophical Theor\' of the State (London: Macmillan Press. 1951), 118. 
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They are different but complementary aspects o f a single idea: that o f a 
society devoted to the harmonious development by all its members o f 
their various gifts and capacities."^^ 
Milne concedes that the positive theory as argued,by Green and Bosanquet heads 
in the direction o f supposing that there is a single way of life in which each of us 
can become the best we have in us: That there is always a rational way to 
resolve a conflict. Berlin on the other hand, is o f the view that not all human 
values are compatible: That men must 'choose between ends equally ultimate'. 
For Berlin, the rational solution is not necessarily a free solution. I f a man would 
have reached a particular decision had he been rational, it is not made a free 
decision by virtue o f that fact. Therefore a man who is coerced, is not a free 
man, for a man cannot be forced to be free.^^ 
Milne recognises the validity o f these claims but defends the positive 
theory from attack by pointing out that Berlin's conclusion is reached by abusing 
it in taking the positive theory to illogical extremes. "But the fact that a theory 
can be abused does not o f itself show that it is false. People can abuse anything i f 
they have a mind to."^'* 
iii) Milne's observations 
Milne admires the positive theory, for it includes the negative theory and then 
adds to it. The pure negative theorists see freedom as comprising only an 
external side. The positive theory adds to this, also comprehending an internal 
side to freedom: 
"On its internal side it is the condition o f mind and character of the 
rational moral agent. Such an agent is emancipated from subjection to 
the natural impulses and inclinations which make up his merely 
empirical self and is free to become the best that he has it in him to be. 
But the significance o f the external side o f freedom is also recognised. 
What is important is not the absence of external constraint as such but 
"". Milne op. cit., 147. 
J.S. Mill represents a similar view. See page 10. 
- \ Milne op. cit. .36. Here Milne acknowledges that Berlin also notes this objection to his 
conclusion. Milne concludes that more discussion is needed. 
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its absence in the form o f interference by anyone, with anyone else's 
rational moral conduct and hence with his self-realisation. This 
external freedom can be secured by a system of rights maintained by 
law, and a society in which it.is secured is a free society."^^ 
In effect, this is to say that "the negative aspect o f personal freedom is a by-
product o f its positive character as self-determination."^^ 
Improvements on Green and Bosanquet: Self-Determination 
Milne is critical of Green and Bosanquet, for they fail to make a distinction 
between personal and moral freedom.^^ Milne sees the latter as the more 
important because i f we concentrated on personal freedom morality would be 
undermined. He is also critical o f the fact that Green and Bosanquet fail to 
recognise that: 
"... at the level o f social morality, the rational agent must accept his 
society's existing way of life uncritically ... His moral freedom is 
therefore freedom within his society's existing way o f life."^^ 
He therefore suggests some refinement o f their views. His proposed 
improvement of Green and Bosanquet's positive theory involves the recognition 
of two forms of self-realisation. To be free, individuals must be selfrdetennining 
in respect o f both their personal and moral freedom. This is achieved by placing 
the importance o f social responsibility and justice over personal well-being. A 
rational agent at the level o f social morality, rather than at the level o f personal 
well being is the most fully free. 
Milne op.-cit., 146. 
Milne op. cit., 148. 
"\ For Milne a person's 'personal freedom' is his own survival. More than this is needed in 
order to be free, according to Milne. Participation with others is indispensable to us. "But 
there can be fruitful co-operation only where there is mutual trust. ... It follows that there is a 
sense in which morality is relevant to rational activity at the level of personal well-being." 
(Milne op cit.. 151) At the level of social morality, the individual will do his best to promote 
his personal well-being, but the social morality will take precedence. Self-determination at its 
highest level involves social morality over personal well being. 
-^ Milne, op. cit.. 15.1. 
Self-determination then,, is not just a-matter for the individual in his 
personal capacity (as Green and Bosanquet believe), it is also a matter o f being a 
moral agent and being self-determining in that role. In order to be able to carry 
out such a role, it is necessary that each individual is equal: 
" A society in which some, by virtue o f their status as members, enjoy 
better opportunities than others for becoming morally and personally 
free, is something less that a free society properly so called."^^ 
So for the pure negative theorists, agreement is the only criterion for a free 
society: No matter what system is used. Green and Bosanquet modify this, as 
positive theorists, demanding that laws and rights protect the individual's 
external freedom. A society o f free individuals for them must be self-determining. 
Milne goes fiarther still, and believes that an individual is free only i f he is both 
morally and personally self-determining, which is possible only i f each individual 
is on equal footing. When applied to the scenario of the pi'egnant woman, 
ambiguities develop. For example, whether it would mean that the pregnant 
woman must have equality with other women in order to be free (and hence 
would not have to suffer forced intervention because no other competent women 
are so forced) or that the pregnant woman and foetus should be on equal footing 
so necessitating forced intervention o f the woman in order to protect it, is 
impossible to say. It depends entirely on the perceived moral status of the 
foetus, which will be looked at in the third chapter. It is largely this ethical 
ambiguity and its legal inapplicability that makes the theory unacceptable. 
Gerald Dworkin: Procedural not Substantive Autonomy 
We cannot incorporate autonomy under either the 'negative liberty' or the 
'positive liberty' headings. For, what we mean by 'autonomy' must come up to 
certain specifications. Firstly it must be applicable in England today rather than 
an ethical consideration. Secondly, autonomy is to be used in a legalistic 
context. It may be that the positive theory proves too metaphysical to be 
applicable in a real-life situation. 
'. Milne, op. cil.. 155. 
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Gerald Dworkin is a contemporary positive theorist writing in 1988^" and he 
refers expressly to 'autonomy' rather than to 'freedom' as a general concept. He 
cannot be called a negative theorist, because he does not see substantive 
independence as being necessary for a person to be autonomous, he merely 
demands that individuals be procedurally free.^' On the other hand, he does 
not accord with the positive theorists, because though he believes (contrary to 
the negative theory) that a person must be able to reflect on his own desires and 
preferences, he does not believe that they need to satisfy moral criterion as the 
positive theorists advocate. Dworkin believes that neither the positive nor the 
negative theory exactly f i t the concept o f autonomy and therefore modifications 
must be made. Hence we will examine Dworkin's view of what constitutes 
individual autonomy and then see how it differs from the liberty theorists. 
a) What is Individual Autonomy? 
Gerald Dworkin's defines individual autonomy thus: 
"Autonomy is a second-order capacity to reflect critically upon one's 
first order preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify 
with these or to change them in light o f higher-order preferences and 
values. By exercising such a capacity we define our nature, give 
meaning and coherence to our lives, and take responsibility for the 
kind of person we are.'"^ 
This is a subjective definition o f autonomy. We have, first-order desires, second-
order desires and perhaps third and forth and so on. Dworkin gives the example 
of a person who desires to smoke (his first-order desire) and also desires not to 
have that desire (his second-order desire). In accentuating the difference 
between first and second-order desires, he delivers us from the mistake of 
thinking that autonomy merely comprises o f a persons wishes. Dworkin believes 
G. Dworkin op. cil.. 
The terms -procedural' and 'substantive independence' will be examined in the section 
'Procedural over substantive independence'. 
G. Dworkin op cil., 108 
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that it is that person's ability-to reflect upon his desires that makes him 
autonomous: 
"I t is not the identification or lack o f identification that is crucial to 
being autonomous, but the capacity to raise the question o f whether I 
wil l identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act."" 
In the case o f the pregnant woman, she may have many first-order desires (such 
as the desire to smoke, eat unhealthily or not to undergo a hospital birth or 
foetal surgery) that she rejects in the light o f her higher-order preferences (such 
as the health o f the foetus, the health o f the future child, the wishes o f her 
family or the general consensus within society). 
Though reflection and the ability to change one's first-order desires is 
necessary for autonomy, Dworkin does not demand that the individual exercises 
this autonomy in any particular way, and it is here that he differs greatly from 
Milne, Green and Bosanquet. 
It is also here that the distinction between his positive theory and the negative 
theories can be clearly distinguished. For M i l l , Cranston and the other negative 
theorists, the key is substantive independence. They believe that lack o f 
interference from the government constitutes greater freedom, that laws should 
not be obeyed without reflection. Wolff , for example, is a negative theorist and 
says: 
"(t)he autonomous man ... may do what another tells him, but not 
because he has been told to do it ... By accepting as final the 
commands o f others he forfeits his autonomy.""* 
Dworkin on the other hand lays no importance on substantive freedom, 
"Suppose we have a person who has not been subjected to the kinds o f 
influence - whatever they turn out to be - that interfere with procedural 
^\ G. Dworkin op. cil.. 15. 
^ R.P. Wnlff In Defence of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row. 1970). 14. 
21 
independence. Suppose the person wants to conduct his or her life in 
accordance with the following: Do whatever my mother or my 
buddies, or my leader or my priest tells me to do. Such a person 
counts, in my view, as autonomous.""'^ 
b) Procedural over Substantive Independence 
Dworkin separates substantive independence (an autonomy with a particular 
content) and procedural independence (an actual independence). He says: 
"... there is a tension between autonomy as a purely formal notion 
(where what one decides for oneself can have any particular content), 
and autonomy as a substantive notion (where only certain decisions 
count as retaining autonomy whereas others count as forfeiting it).""'*^ 
He does so out of a desire to make autonomy compatible with human values 
such as love, loyalty and commitment. He considers both sides o f the argument; 
that a person who decides to follow every whim o f his priest is not autonomous 
because he is not thinking for himself; is not forming independent judgements 
about what to do or how to do it. On the other hand, however, it was his 
decision to follow the whims of his priest so surely he is autonomous in his 
actions. Dworkin believes that the negative theorists cannot reconcile values 
such as love, loyalty and commitment with autonomy. This is because they see 
autonomy as a fixed rationale, with a certain content. For example R.S. 
Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, say: 
"An autonomous agent must be independent-minded. He must not 
have to depend on others for being told what he is to think or do ... a 
person is 'autonomous' to the degree that what he thinks and does 
cannot be explained without reference to his own activity of mind."'' 
Dworkin, on the other hand, does not believe that a particular content is 
necessary for a person to be autonomous: 
G. Dworkin op. cit., 21. 
G. Dworkin op. cil., 12. 
'Aiiinnomv'7197n 46 Philosophy 301. 
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"What is valuable about autonomy is that the commitments .and 
promises a person makes be ones he views as his, as part o f the person 
he wants to be, so that he defines himself via those commitments. But 
whether they be long-term or short, prima facie or absolute, 
permanent or temporary, is not what contributes to their value. 
Though, indeed, there may be good reasons for limiting one's 
abandonment o f substantive independence."^^ 
The last sentence is a recognition by Dworkin that substantive independence, 
though not a necessary constituent o f autonomy, still forms part o f the picture 
and that liberty (as defined by Dworkin as recognition o f first-order preferences) 
is important. For Dworkin, independence is a freedom from coercion rather 
than a freedom from influence, for we are influenced in every action that we 
undertake. Hence a person can be acting autonomously even i f his choice is not 
independently deduced. The only independence that Dworkin demands is 
independence in the form o f choice, not independence in the form of freedom 
from all influences; A pregnant woman is not necessarily autonomous merely by 
making a choice, for she must first follow her personal preferences."^ However, 
subject to this, should she choose to follow the advice or even the whim of her 
doctor or her partner, or any other group, individual or God on the issues o f her 
pregnancy, then for Dworkin, she is still acting autonomously. , 
Dworkin's view conflicts somewhat with Milne and the other positive theorists 
examined above. Some of the positive theorists believe that morality is an 
integral part o f autonomy. For these theorists, autonomy involves not only a 
commitment to personal freedom but that to be truly free morality is necessary. 
The reasons for this conflict are twofold: Firstly, Dworkin is concerned with 
individual autonomy rather than what makes a free society: Secondly Dworkin 
has in mind a certain constraints. He is o f the view that a theory of autonomy is 
satisfactory only is it satisfies various criteria.'"' Thus, amongst others, it must 
'^ G. Dworkin op. cit.. 26. 
Also she may have been coerced, threatened or deceived, the ambits of which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
"'. The following criterion are outlined by G. Dworkin op. cit., 7-12. 
23 
be logically consistent with other concepts, empirically possible, ideologically 
neutral and have judgmental relevance. For Dworkin, his concept of autonomy 
is not theoretical but practical. 
c) Liberty and Autonomy 
Dworkin differs from the other positive theorists in that he takes the theory o f 
freedom, and divides it. He separates liberty and autonomy. The earlier theorists 
did not do this, where they see liberty as being o f great importance, Dworkin 
sees autonomy in the same light and reduces the importance o f Uberty. 
Dworkin defines liberty as "roughly, the ability of a person to do what she 
wants, to have (significant) options that are not closed or made less eligible by 
the actions o f other agents."*' Autonomy, on the other hand, he sees as the 
power o f self-determination. The two are different, he claims because only 
coercion and force can interfere with liberty, but to interfere with autonomy, 
deception wil l also suffice. Dworkin cites an example, to aid this distinction, 
that was originally provided by John Locke. A person is put into a police cell 
and told that it is locked when in reality it is not locked. The man does not 
move because he believes that he is locked in the room. His freedom is 
uncompromised, but, according to Locke and to Dworkin, his autonomy is 
violated. For Dworkin, liberty is concerned with first-order desires whereas 
autonomy is the ability to use the first-order desires together with higher-order 
desires. To define what is truly free, he believes that the second-order desires 
must not be ignored. 
Hence his view is positive, or subjective, because he believes that autonomy is 
internal as well as external. It is a condition of the mind rather than just a 
condition imposed on the mind. Dworkin defends what he calls a 'rather weak' 
definition o f autonomy in that it has no particular content, however, the positive 
or subjective theory lies within: 
. G. Dworkin op. cit.. 14. 
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it is only through a'more adequate understanding o f notions such as 
tradition, authority, commitment and loyalty, and the forms of human 
community in which these have their roots, that we shall be able to 
develop a conception of autonomy free from paradox and worthy o f 
admiration."''^ 
However, unlike Bosanquet, he does not see rationality as the key to 
autonomy; it is not, he claims, necessary to be a rational moral agent. Milne, 
on the other hand, emphasises the need for moral as well as personal freedom 
and that a free person must be self-determining in both respects in order to be 
free. 
i) Self-determinism 
Dworkin aims to avoid the difficulties that arise out o f a reliance on a strict 
interpretation o f the term self-determination. The main difficulty with the 
concept is as follows: 
" I n all three areas - rnoral, political, social - we find that the is a notion 
of the self which is to be respected, left unmanipulated, and which is, in 
certain ways, independent and self-determining. But we find certain 
tensions and paradoxes. I f the notion o f self-determination is given a 
very strong definition - the unchosen chooser, the uninfluenced 
influencer - then it seems as i f autonomy is impossible. We know that 
all individuals have a history. They develop socially and psychologically 
in a given environment with a set o f biological endowments. They 
mature slowly and are, therefore, heavily influenced by parents, peers, 
and culture. How, then, can we talk o f self-determinafion?"'*" 
Dworkin defends the usage of the term self-determination, but only in its 
moderate form. I f taken to the limits o f its definition it could be argued that we 
are never self-determining because we are always influenced by our society. 
Self-determination must therefore be used to refer to decisions that are made by 
the individual because he uses his capacity for choice. This ties in with his 
preference for procedural over substantive independence. He sees independence 
as comprising freedom from coercion and not freedom from all influence. 
G. Dworkin, op. cit.. 47. 
G. Dworkin op. cit., 12. 
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Similarly, he believes that an individual can be self-determining even though his 
view is inevitably shaped by society. Unlike Milne, Dworkin does not claim that 
an autonomous individual must be morally self-determining as well as personally 
self-determining. 
Conclusion 
The aim is to find a theory o f autonomy which can be o f use to the legal 
philosophers who propose laws on the restricting o f that freedom. It is on this 
point that the concept o f rationality and social morality must be kept out o f a 
theory o f individual autonomy (thought there is relevance to state autonomy). 
The freedom o f a person must depend on his own mind not on the minds that 
decide what is and is not rational or moral. On the other hand, the theory, must 
not demand substantive freedom. I f I decide to follow the instructions of my 
doctor I must be considered autonomous in that decision in the same way that i f 
I decide to play tennis with a friend tomorrow, and then feel I must honour that 
obligation to the friend, I wil l be autonomous in my decision to play tennis. 
No decision is totally independent. I f we felt no obligation to any person, 
not even to our-selves, would we truly starve in the same way as the donkey 
placed between two equally tasty bales o f hay? It is almost impossible to fathom, 
because in this world, in this society, we live with others. We are not only an 
entity alone, but a part o f the whole. Few decisions could ever be made 
without considering its eflFects on those other than our selves. But we can still 
be autonomous in our decision i f first we are not coerced or forced and second 
i f we personally make the decision, regardless at why it is reached. 
Harvey TeflF notes that patients priinarily want to get well, and self-
determination is less important to them than good communication with the 
doctor, or 'collaborative autonomy' as he calls it.'*'* Such a view is not so 
greatly removed from Dworkins' as may seem to be the case, for Dworkin's 
procedural independence allows reliance and collaboration with others. In the 
next chapter, this concept o f autonomy will be applied to the medical context. 
'> Harx'cv T°fT'^—-''-•^ ' ^^ ^^  Perspectives on the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
(O.xford: Clarendon Press, 1994). .\.vvii. 
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and' more particularly to the case of the pregnant woman, affirming the 
importance o f autonomy as Dworkin has defined it. 
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2: THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S RIGHT TO REFUSE 
TREATMENT 
Introduction 
The various definitions o f autonomy have been examined it has been decided that 
neither the negative nor the positive liberty view are suitable. It is contended that 
Dworkin's model o f autonomy combines the better aspects o f the two views and 
then adds to them, hence separating the terms liberty and autonomy. 
The purpose o f this chapter is to apply Dworkin's definition of autonomy 
to the case o f the pregnant woman and her right to refuse treatment.' This will 
involve looking at standard practice, and at how the courts have dealt with 
contentious areas. The proposition that autonomy is hard to protect is examined, 
as is the relationship between autonomy and choice. Following this, other claims 
are considered that may outweigh the claim to autonomy, such as patient 
welfare, or the principle o f paternalism. 
Note also that it is the right o f the woman to refuse treatment rather than 
her right to demand it that concerns us. The pregnant woman's right to demand 
treatment is considered in the third chapter. Support will be given to the thesis 
that it is ethical to Hmit the autonomy o f the pregnant woman by limiting her 
right to demand treatment, but not to do so by limiting her right to refiase 
treatment. Hence the chapter wi l l consider first the courts' treatment o f the 
pregnant woman and her right to reflise treatment with special reference to the 
doctrine o f informed consent and the landmark case. Re S .^ This will be 
followed by an examination o f the relationship between choice and autonomy 
and finally by challenges to patient autonomy such as patient welfare goals. 
. Treatment that affects the foetus. 
-. Re S (adult: refusal, of medical treatment) 11992) 3 W.L.R. 806 (Hereafter ReS). 
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The English Courts and the Right to Refuse Treatment 
a) Consent 
In English law, , the competent patient must consent to any treatment proposed 
by the physician before treatment can commence.^ Any physical force applied by 
the physician without consent constitutes a battery in English tort and criminal 
law. Failure to adequately inform a patient can lead to a successful negligence 
claim.'* The consent doctrine may be specifically referred to as 'informed 
consent', 'voluntary consent' or 'real consent' (though 'informed consent' is the 
usual name given to the doctrine and the one that shall be used from here 
onwards) and each varies. However, there are collectively two sides to the 
doctrine; the first is that o f ensuring that the patient freely consents; and the 
second is that o f ensuring that the patient has sufficient information with which 
to make the decision. 
The information a patient needs differs according to the nature of the 
individual and his illness. Because o f this, it is hard for the courts to ensure that 
patients are sufficiently informed. On the other hand, the courts do concern 
themselves with disclosure (or lack o f disclosure) o f risks to the patient,^ though 
this does not specifically concern this debate and shall be circumvented. Instead, 
the debate will follow the legal dilemmas surrounding the actual consent, such as 
whether or not consent was actually given and when the courts should ignore the 
requirement o f consent and order the physician to proceed with treatment 
regardless. 
There are various exceptions to the rule that a patient must consent to 
treatment, such as emergencies (where the patient is presented to the physician 
in a state whereby he is unable to give consent due to the severity of his 
condition), the therapeutic privilege (where the physician misrepresents the 
information to the patient in order to avoid excessive harm) and age or mental 
.^ Subject to the exceptions noted in this section. 
''. The test for negligence is outlined in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee 
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 582. especially at 586 where the "reasonable doctor' test is outlined. 
.^ See Sidavvav v. the Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and Maudslev Hospital 
( I986| W.L.R. 480. 
29 
illness (where the physician or the state act on behalf o f an incompetent patient). 
In these cases the welfare o f the patient is said to overcome his interest in self-
determination and the requirement o f consent is waived. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis it shall be assumed that the pregnant woman is competent*^ 
and able to give consent. 
In most medical areas there is little question o f the right to refuse 
treatment, however, problems do arise when an individual's life is at stake, 
because the government has an interest in the sanctity of life. Hence a patient 
who refuses treatment that would save his life, or a woman who refuses 
treatment that would save the life o f her foetus, present a particularly great 
dilemma. In a sense^ there is less o f a dilemma in . the case o f the patient who 
refuses treatment that would save his own life because he is harming no-one else 
by his action. The pregnant woman on the other hand, is harming an entity that 
is arguably separate from herself Also the recent technological advances in 
foetal surgery and treatment have made the foetus much more treatable. Though 
most women will welcome any intervention that may save or aid her foetus, 
some inevitably wi l l not and this chapter suggests a rationale for their 
protection.^ 
b) The Rationale Behind Informed Consent 
The primary rationale behind the doctrine o f informed consent is autonomy, 
though privacy and liberty also play a large part. It is suggested there is a place 
for autonomy (as Dworkin defined it) as a competent patient's right to grant or 
refuse consent in every aspect o f medicine, including the scenario o f the 
pregnant woman. 
i) Autonomy 
The protection o f an individual's liberty is considered by many commentators to 
be o f extreme importance, and indeed, liberty is protected by the consent 
requirement. For Hobbes and Mi l l , lack of interference with an individual's 
Though at page 45 the definition and application of incompetence is considered. 
'. See Katherine KnopolT 'Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgen>'?' (1991) 79 
Californian Law Review 499, who answers her question in the affirmative. 
options enhances his liberty, which is regarded as important in order to prevent 
men turning into 'industrial sheep'.* For Rousseau and Green, on the other hand, 
more than a mere lack o f interference is involved; for them there must be a 
presence o f a range o f alternatives and opportunities.^ Always, however, the 
key lies in being able to act out one's preferences. 
However, as is noted in the first chapter, autonomy goes further than 
liberty. Though interfering with one's liberty usually involves interfering with 
one's autonomy, the opposite does not always apply. In cases o f deception, as 
Dworkin points out, the individual's autonomy can be lost without reducing his 
liberty. Dworkin believes that autonomy rather than liberty or even privacy 
underlies the doctrine o f consent, though he recognises that these concepts do 
influence the doctrine. Mason and McCall Smith in their Medico-Legal 
Encyclopaedia also place the concept o f autonomy at the heart o f the doctrine of 
informed consent: 
"The concept o f autonomy can be seen as regulating the doctor / 
patient relationship. On the one hand the doctor has the power to 
choose whether he wil l take part in a particular treatment and, on the 
other, the prerogative o f the patient must, in the modern moral 
climate, be to retain the right to decide what is to be done with his 
body. Autonomy is therefore at the heart o f the doctrine o f informed 
consent."" 
Hence, the patient's right to give or refuse informed consent is largely derived 
from a respect for autonomy. One reason for this is outlined in the dictum o f 
Lord Gof f in Collins v. Willcock: "The fundamental principle, plain and 
incontestable, is that every person's body is inviolate." 
See Mill and Tocqueville in Lukes, Individualism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 56. 
See G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (from the Cambridge Studies in 
Philosophy range) (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge Universit}' Press, 1988), 
105. 
"'. Sec chapter one, page 2.1 
". J.K. Mason and R.A. McCall-Sniith. Medico-Lcual Encyclopaedia (London: Buttenyorths. 
1987). 52. 
119841 3 All E.R. 374 at 378. 
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ii) Privacy 
Privacy, on the other hand, involves the following scenario: 
" A private existence within a public world, an area within which the 
individual is or should be left alone by others and able to do and think 
whatever he chooses - to pursue his own good in his own way, as Mil l 
puts it." '- ' 
This notion o f privacy is, perhaps, too closely related to autonomy. Gerald 
Dworkin makes a sharper distinction between the two: 
"[Privacy] is intimately linked with the idea o f being scrutinised by 
others ... Thus, typical interference's with privacy include observations 
of our bodies, behaviour, and interactions with others. The more 
control we have over ourselves, the more privacy we maintain."''' 
According to Dworkin, the main distinction between the two is as follows: 
"(With autonomy) what is controlled is this information coming to you, 
not the information coming from you. I do not know something about 
you that you might wish to conceal. I conceal something from you that 
you might wish to know. Thus, autonomy but not privacy is 
diminished."'' 
Hence the pregnant woman suffers an invasion of her privacy when she is put 
under observation against her wi l l , or forced to aiiswer certain questions. 
A more subtle invasion o f privacy is,noted by B.A. Lawrence Beech, who 
believes that the routine hospitalisation o f the pregnant woman (to give birth) is 
largely to make the job easier for the physician rather than to protect the woman 
and her baby."' This riiay constitute unnecessary observation and therefore an 
invasion o f privacy, and Beech claims that it may result in post-natal depression, 
or even in the woman' avoiding fijture, pregnancies. (or facing them with 
trepidation). Caroline Whitbeck feels similarly regarding pre-natal screening. 
Lukes, op. cil. 59. 
G. Dworkin, op. cit. 10.1. 
' \ G. Dworkin, op. cit. 104. 
'Women's Views of Childbirth' in Chard and Richards (eds.) Obstetrics in the 1990s: 
Current Controversies (O.xford: Mac Keith Press, 1992), 153. 
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Though she notes the value o f the technique, she claims that its over-use has a 
negative effect on pregnant women." 
Others go even further in their claims that the privacy o f pregnant women 
is under assault. Barbara Katz Rothman claims that pregnant women are being 
treated as marketable products. '* As the pregnant woman is de-humanised, she 
is scrutinised in order to protect the foetus and her privacy is disregarded. 
Tabitha Powledge takes a similar view contending that commercialised surrogacy 
is damaging in that it de-humanises the w o m a n . E l a i n e Hoffman Baruch claims 
that the new technologies increase the likelihood o f intervention which in turn 
appeases men's envy o f women's reproductive powers.^" Baruch believes that 
there wi l l soon come a time when the birthing process can be taken out o f the 
woman's body altogether. Should this prove to be the case (as seems likely with 
recent technological interventions and news reports), then the woman's privacy 
could still be said to suffer because something (pregnancy) that was private to 
her would no longer be so. 
These invasions o f privacy may also invade the autonomy of the woman. 
For her self-determination may be unduly swayed by norms which, upon closer 
examination, should not be accepted. Hence, the patient may consent to 
screening or to hospitalisation out o f a misconceived appreciation o f the risks, 
and hence the decision to consent could be said to be misinformed. However, 
the solution to this reduction o f autonomy is unclear, for the disadvantages that 
Beech and Whitbeck speak o f are frequently offset by the advantages offered by 
the new technologies. Further, it is not at all clear that the time saved by such 
' 'Fetal Imaging and Fetal Monitoring: Finding the Issues' in E. Hoffman Baruch, A.F. 
D'Adamo and J. Seager (eds.), Embryo Ethics and Women's Rights: E.xploring the New 
Reproductive Technoloaies (New York and London: Harrington Park Press Inc., 1988), 47 
(hereafter Hoffman Banich). See also G.R. Dunstan 'Calming or Harming? The Ethics of 
Screening for Fetal Defects' in S.L. Barron and D.F. Roberts (eds) Issues in Fetal Medicine. 
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Symposium of the Galton Institute; London 1992 (London and 
New York: Macmillan Press, 1995), at 134 (hereafter Barron and Roberts). 
"Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life' in Hoffman Barucli. op cit. 
96. 
" "Reproductive Technologies and the Bottom Line', in Hoffman Baruch. op. cit.. 203. 
"A womb of His Own", in Hoffman Baruch, op, cit.. 135. 
routine is not a necessity in our health system where resources are far from 
unlimited. However, bad effects can be limited by ensuring that screening is 
followed up with good af^er care especially where an abnormality is found and 
foetal surgery, treatment or aboilion options need to be considered.^' 
Therefore, though the pregnant woman should never be legally forced into such 
medical treatment, it may be acceptable that the physician advises such a course 
of action in the interests o f pregnant women as a group. 
c) Is the Foetus Viewed as a Patient in Medicine? 
The challenge to the pregnant woman's autonomy lies in the fact that she carries 
a foetus which (it shall be assumed) deserves a certain measure o f protection, 
due to its human origins and potential human status.^^ I t could be argued that 
the pregnant woman should not have the power to reflise treatment that would 
benefit the foetus, because the foetus can now be medically viewed as a patient. 
Because the foetus is becoming increasingly medically controllable and methods 
of screening the pregnant woman (including ultrasound, amniocentesis and 
chorionic villus sampling) are now possible to discover abnormalities o f the 
foetus^^, the foetus is becoming humanised. Before ultrasound, an abnormal 
foetus could rarely be detected. Now, not only can a physician detect 
abnormalities, but he can occasionally offer various therapeutic, medicinal and 
surgical remedies, including (if, indeed, this can be called a remedy) termination 
o f the foetus. These treatments differ from post-natal treatments in that they 
necessarily affect the pregnant woman. There has been a gradual change of 
terminology with the onset o f these new technologies in that there is sometimes 
not only considered to be one patient, but two. This is especially true in the 
United States o f America where Michael Harrison and his team at the University 
o f California have pioneered the work on foetal surgery. He specifically refers to 
-'. See W.R. Barclay. R.A. McCormick. J.B. Sidbury. M. Michejda and G.D. Hodgen 'The 
Ethics of In Utero Surger>'' Journal of the American Medical Association 246 (1981), 1550 at 
1551. 
This assumption will be tested in chapter three. 
Ultrasound emerged in the late 1970s and amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling are 
onI\ now becoming w idely used. 
the foetus as a patient.^'' When the physician treats an entity, he is attempting to 
make it well and it can therefore be seen as a patient. In the case o f the foetus, 
the physician considers not only the welfare o f the woman, but also that o f the 
foetus. Still, it may not be true that woman and foetus deserve equal protection. 
The physician would perhaps feel duty bound to prevent unnecessary pain to the 
foetus ( i f it actually feels pain at the relevant point in gestation), but it would be a 
mistake to demand that the woman's informed consent be overlooked whenever 
the foetus is in need o f attention. This is largely because o f the ill-effects that 
would result to the pregnant woman from a denial o f the opportunity to consent, 
for this would necessitate coercion o f the woman. It should be clear that such 
coercion would be vastly at odds with the respect for autonomy that has been 
outlined in chapter one." '^ However, it is equally true that the physician should 
never be forced to carry out procedures to which he is morally opposed. Instead 
he should refer the patient to another physician. 
As the techniques improve and more protection can be offered to the 
foetus, so too must the guidance to the physician be i n c r e a s e d . H e must be 
made aware o f the danger o f treating the woman and foetus as legal equals, and 
the woman's informed consent must not be subjugated. But equally, he must be 
made aware that some measure o f protection must be given to the foetus and 
that a woman's request for treatment must not be heeded without careful 
consideration. Again the distinction between the woman's right to refijse 
treatment and to demand treatment, is crucial. The latter may be tempered 
whereas the former must be respected provided that the pregnant woman is 
competent. Such legal certainty would help the physician's position considerably. 
See 'The Foetus as a Patient' Annals Surgery, 213 (March 1991), 279. 
For an ethical perspective on this issue see Anne Gilmore 'Is the Fetus a Patient?' 
Canadian Medical Association Journal 128 (1982), 1472. 
See S.L. Barron "The Changing Status of the Fetus' in Barron and Roberts op. cit.. 1 for an 
oven'iew of the historical changes in our perception of the foetus and its effects on the 
treatment of the pregnant woman. 
In English law, the woman's individual autonomy is protected in that the 
foetus has no civil legal personality (according to Re F (in utero)^^). In Re F. the 
Court o f Appeal decided that the court has no jurisdiction to make an unborn 
child a ward o f court. This was the sole question put to the court. However, the 
dictum of the judges shows that some sympathy for the Local Authority's cause 
exists. The Local Authority wished to make the foetus a ward of court because 
the mother already had one son in care (with adoption proceedings initiated) and 
had disappeared. Lord May offered the following view, obiter. 
"On these facts... I have no doubt myself that i f the court had the 
power I would give leave to issue the necessary originating summons 
and make the unborn child a ward o f court. "^^ 
The court, however, feh bound by Paton v. Trustees o f BPAS^^ where the 
pregnant woman's husband was refused his claim to prevent the abortion o f the 
foetus due to a lack o f locus standi and C v. S'" where, again, the father was 
said to have no locus standi because the foetal rights crystallise at birth and not 
before. 
In Re F however. Lord Balcombe, contrary to Lord May feared the 
consequences o f allowing the claim (having recognised that it could not proceed 
on the authorities). He said: 
"Approaching the question as one o f principle, in my judgement there 
is not jurisdiction to make an unborn child a ward o f court. Since an 
unborn child has, ex hypothesis, no existence independent o f its 
mother, the only purpose o f extending the jurisdiction to include a 
foetus is to enable the mother's actions to be controlled."^' 
- \ [1988] 2 All E.R. 193. reaffirmed in Ranee \\ Mid Downs Health Authorit^ • [1991) 1 All 
E.R. 80L 
Re F (in utero) op. cit.. 194. 
[1978J2 AllE.R. 989. 
[19871 1 All E.R. 1230. 
Re F (In utcro) op cit.. 200. 
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Lord Balcombe then went on to quote Lowe on the dangers o f such a 
concession; 
"I t would mean for example, that the mother would be unable to leave 
the jurisdiction without the court's consent. The court being charged to 
protect the foetus' welfare would surely have to order the mother to 
stop smoking, imbibing alcohol and indeed any activity which might be 
hazardous to the child. Taking it to the extreme were the court to be 
faced with saving the baby's life or the mother's it would surely have 
to protect the baby's."^^ 
In other words, over zealous protection o f the foetus, despite its values, would 
create such a deficit o f the pregnant woman's autonomy so as to be not only 
unproductive, but positively harmful. Derek Morgan recognises that both the 
'Slippery Slope' argument and the consideration o f 'Therapeutic Conflict' 
between the parties lay behind Lord Balcombe's argument.^^ 
The physicians face a complicated scenario. On the one hand, the courts 
deny that the foetus has a legal personality, but on the other hand, the new 
technologies provide the physician with a means by which to protect the foetus. 
The law has simplified this slightly by conferring a duty o f care upon the 
physicians (to be owed to the foetus), should it survive for 48 hours. However, 
Re S^** has recently confused the physicians duty to the foetus and woman 
respectively. 
d) ReS 
As already mentioned, the consent issue rather than the information the woman 
receives forms the centre o f this debate. The ethical divergences o f this 
contentious area are evidenced in the confijsions at court. The courts are 
inconsistent in their affirmation o f patient autonomy, they seem to see autonomy 
'^ Lowe, 'Wardship and Abortion Prevention - Further Observations' (1980) 96 Law Quarterly 
Review 29 at 30. As referred to by Balcombe LJ in Re F (in utero) op. cit., at 200. 
'Judges on Deliver)': Change, Continuity and regulation in Obstetric Practice' in T. Chard 
and M.P.M. Richards (eds.) Obstetrics in the 1990s: Current Controversies (O.vford and New 
York: Mac Keith Press, 1992), 24 - 43. at 28. 
Rc^op. cil.. 
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as an all or nothing doctrine, as opposed to the definition proposed by G. 
Dworkin. 
The courts face situations where the woman's wishes clash with the 
physician's view of the welfare of the foetus (and / or the welfare o f the woman 
herself), and seem unable to resolve the situation in the face o f the ethical 
tensions. As yet, there has not been a case where the pregnant woman is forced 
to undergo foetal surgery, for the technique is not yet sufficiently advanced. 
However, there have been cases o f forced treatment for the sake for the foetus, 
which set an unwelcome and dangerous precedent. 
In England, it has been deemed that a capable adult may refuse treatment, 
even i f his health, or indeed his life, wil l decline as a r e s u l t . H e n c e in Airedale 
National Health Service Trust v.. Bland. Lord Keith said (obiter): 
"... it is unlawful, so as to constitute both a tort and the crime of 
battery, to administer medical treatment to an adult, who is conscious 
and o f sound mind, without his consent: In Re F (Mental Patient: 
Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. Such a person is completely at liberty to 
decline to undergo treatment, even is the result o f his doing so will be 
that he will die.""'^ 
However in Re T^^ this principle was thrown into some conflision. The facts o f 
Re T are usefial in order to shed a light on the later Re S. In Re T the pregnant T 
was injured in a car crash. T's parents were separated, and T's mother, a 
Jehovah's Witness, had brought T up having promised not to raise her as a 
Jehovah's Witness (largely because the father was not o f that religious 
persuasion). T retained some of the beliefs o f the sect, though she was not a 
practising Jehovah's Witness. 
In the early stages o f her hospitalisation, T, after being alone with her 
mother, informed the medical staff that she did not want a blood transfusion. 
For medical case examples and analysis see S. Finfer, S. Howell, J. Miller, K. Willett and J. 
Wilson-MacDonald "Managing Patients who Refuse Blood Transfusions: an Ethical Dilemma' 
British Medical Journal 308 (May 1994). 1423. 
[19931 I All ER 821. at 860. See Elizabeth Roberts Re C and the boundaries of autonomy' 
(1994) 10 Professional Negligence 98-101. 
Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R. 649 (Hereafter Re T). 
The staff told her that it was extremely unlikely that she would need one, and 
that there were limited alternatives to a transflision in any event, following 
which, T signed a form withholding consent. Though T was pregnant upon 
entry to hospital, her baby was stillborn, hence the issue was not about the 
protection o f the foetus, but about T's consent. In the first hearing it was held 
that a transfiasion was permissible because it was in T's best interests. In the 
second hearing it was held that the transfusion was permissible because T had 
neither consented nor refused, the treatment. At the final hearing it was held that 
T had been competent to withhold consent, but that firstly her mother had 
unduly influenced her decision and secondly, the staff had not adequately 
explained that her life could depend on the transfusion (as indeed turned out to 
be the case). Hence the transfiasion was permissible despite the lack o f consent. 
It seems that the court was anxious to find a way, by whatever possible means, 
to justify the transfijsion. Because there was ambiguity in T's affirmation that 
death was preferable to a blood transfiasion, society's interest in preserving life 
superseded the individual interest in autonomy. 
However, in the case o f the pregnant woman, the case is more 
complicated still, for her refusal to consent to treatment may harm not only 
herself, but her foetus. In the 1992 case Re S, despite the legal precedents 
affirming that the foetus has no civil legal personality, the courts" favoured a 
forced Caesarean operation. 
In Re S both woman and foetus were fated to die (according to the testimony o f 
the surgeon) unless the Caesarean was hurriedly performed, for the baby was 
well overdue. S refused the operation on religious grounds (she was a 'Born 
Again Christian') but the High Court judge. Sir Stephen Brown, in a 20 minute 
hearing (for time was o f the essence) ordered the Caesarean regardless. The 
matter had been left open by the dictum of Lord Donaldson M R in Re T, which 
he quoted in his judgement: 
"An adult patient who ... suffers from no mental incapacity has an 
absolute right to ... refijse [treatment]. ... The only possible 
qualification is a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a 
viable foetus ... when ... the courts wil l be faced with a novel problem 
of considerable legal and ethical complexity ... This right of choice is 
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not limited to decisions which others might regard as sensible. It exists 
notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent"'^* 
In other words. Lord Donaldson expressly contemplated the Re S situation. 
Harvey Teflf denies the possibility that Lord Donaldson justified such intervention 
merely to prevent injury to the pregnant woman, and contends that the 
protection o f the foetus was the all important element in Re S^ .^ This, he notes, 
raises the objection that the conferral o f judicial status o f the foetus was 
expressly denied in Paton v. BPAS''", Re F (in Utero)"*'. C v. S'*^  and Ranee v. 
Mid Downs Health Authority'*'. 
Re S is an undesirable decision in that it implies that the foetus has a 
judicial status which binding decisions prohibit. Further, it makes a distinction 
between pregnant women and all other patients,'*'' though pregnant women 
surely deserve protection o f their religious and cultural ideals as much as any 
other citizen.''^ Also, as Harvey Teflf notes "The lack o f a clearly delineated 
Re T op, cit.. 786. 
Harvey Teff Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on Doctor-Patient Relationship (0.\ford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) (Hereafter Teff, Reasonable Care), says: "It therefore appears that in 
Re S the judge must have seen the interests of the unborn child as determinative ... the temis 
of the declaration authorising the operation referred to it as being 'in the vital interests of the 
patient and the unborn child she is carrj'ing.' (Re T op. cit., 807)". Teff, Reasonable Care op. 
ciL, 154. 
[1979] Q.B. 276. 
'". Re F (in utero) op. cit.. 
[1989] Q.B. 135. 
[1991] 1 All E.R. 801. 
Though Re T is also disturbing in this area. 
The religious persuasion of an individual can effect his views concerning the foetus. For 
example, Jakobovits 'Respect for Life: Embryonic Considerations', in D R. Bromham, M E. 
Dalton, J.C. Jackson and P.J.R Millican (eds ), Ethics in Reproductive Medicine (London, 
Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), 47, speaks from the Jewish perspective, contending 
that although the foetus is not a human, it deser\'es very stringent protection. He believes that 
even the destruction of potential life is a sin. 
Another often cited perspective is that of the Roman Catholic Church, who claim that 
there is a gradual importation of the soul. The important factor is therefore that the process is 
left in God's hands and is not subject to harmful interference by man (rather than arguments as 
to humanness). See R.D. Lawler "Moral Reflections on the New Technologies: .A Catholic 
Analysis', in E. Hoffman Baruch. op. cit.. 167. 
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approach, however understandable, could in theory facilitate coerced medical 
treatment in less drastic circumstances."'"^ This criticism was noted by Derek 
Morgan: 
"There is no slippery slope more perilous than that which is falsely 
supposed not to be slippery ... i f enforced medical regimes are 
countenanced, the occasionally perceived need for non-therapeutic 
Caesarean section, hospital detention or inter uterine transfer might 
trigger demands for court ordered prenatal screening, fetal surgery 
and restriction on diet, athletic and sexual recreations o f pregnant 
women. ... I f non-consensual Caesarean can be described as doing the 
mother no harm then it is difficult to imagine how the possible 
interventions could be refused."''^ 
Morgan also notes that the position o f the putative father could arguably have 
changed since Re S. He advises that: 
"... the price which we must be prepared to pay for protecting the 
integrity and autonomy of all competent adults is the rare, occasional 
risk o f death or serious injury to an unborn fetus or to the woman 
herself"'* 
This is clearly not the view of the judge in Re S. for. as Harvey Teflf says: 
"That the courts are reluctant to take the legal implications o f patient 
autonomy to their logical conclusions, even as regards adult patients 
who are not deemed incompetent, was graphically demonstrated in Re 
-16 Teff. Reasonable Care op. cit., 155. 
Derek Morgan 'Whatever happened to consent?' 142 New Law Journal (1992), 1448, at 
1448. 
Derek Morgan ibid.. 
Tcff Reasonable Care op. cil., 153. 
41 
What is also questionable about Re S. is its application o f the United States 
decision Re A.C.^". In Re A C , A.C. had a relapse of cancer whilst pregnant. 
The hospital decided that a Caesarean section was needed to save the foetus 
when her condition became terminal and refused to treat the cancer for fear o f 
injuring the foetus. A court order was sought in order to carry out the 
Caesarean, and granted despite the fact that the operation would probably kill 
A.C.. A.C. was resuscitated and told o f the impending operation whereupon she 
refijsed consent and her parents appealed against the decision, but the appeal 
was dismissed. The baby was delivered by Caesarean and tragically soon died. 
A.C. died two days later, partly as a result o f the operation. The parents sued 
the hospital and the Court o f Appeal held that the judge at first instance had 
erred. 
"... in virtually all cases the question o f what is to be done is to be 
decided by the patient - the pregnant woman- on behalf o f herself and 
the fetus. I f the patient is incompetent or otherwise unable to give an 
informed consent to a proposed course o f medical treatment, then her 
decision must be ascertained through the procedure known as 
substituted judgement. Because the trial court did not follow that 
procedure," we vacate its order and remand the case for further 
proceedings."^' 
In Re A C , A.C. was incompetent and the trial judge followed the wrong 
procedure according to the American law on incompetence. It is hard indeed to 
comprehend how Sir Steven Brown in Re S thought that Re A C. was a 
precedent for forced intervention. 
Barbara Hewson concludes o f Re S: 
"Re S flies in the face o f Re F [in utero]. It has all the features which in 
Re AC militated against forcible intervention: powerflil arguments for 
upholding a competent patient's decision not to undergo surgical 
procedure for another's benefit, or her own; civil liabilities and public 
policy arguments, no effective legal or medical representation for the 
patient; impossibility o f enforcement; failure by counsel and judge to 
. 533 A. 2d 611 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals (1988), Re AC. 573 A. 2d 1235 
(1990) appeal court. 
Per Judge Terr>- 573 A. 2d 1235 at 1237. 
42 
consider critical legal issues; lack o f important factual and expert 
evidence, which might cause a judge to decide otherwise; a shortage o f 
time, which can prevent a judge from acting judicially."' ' 
Since Re S the commitment to patient autonomy in general seems to have been 
affirmed in the 1994 decision. Re C'^ Here the patient's decision to refuse 
consent for an operation to remove his gangrenous foot was validated by the 
court even though the patient would probably die as a result. Despite the fact 
that C was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, expert evidence confirmed that his 
capacity to consent was evident.^'' However, though the patient in general can 
expect to find respect for his autonomy in withholding or granting consent, the 
pregnant woman is still suffering unacceptable instances of forced intervention. 
Joanna Bale, on the 23rd September, 1996 reported that further instances of 
forced Caesarean operations have taken place and that one such recipient is 
taking legal action against the responsible hospital. A separate action is also 
being instigated by the Association for Improvement in Maternity Services 
(Aims) on similar grounds. This follows two recent unreported court orders for 
Caesarean operations. Disturbingly, Bale notes: 
"Now that a further case has emerged, lawyers believe many more 
women have undergone forced Caesareans after secret emergency 
court rulings in which the patients were unrepresented. A legal Source 
said: "We know of five family division judges who have done this and 
there may be many more."^' 
Though the precise grounds o f these actions are unknown, it is hoped that the 
courts will put a stop to forced Caesareans and the precedent it sets for the other 
interventative treatments that are developing. 
Barbara Hewson, 'Mother Knows Best' New Law Journal 142 (1992) 1538 at 1550. 
Re C (adult: refusal of treatment) [ 1994] 1 W.L.R. 290 (hereafter Re C). 
Some are critical of this decision. For example Elizabeth Roberts op. cit., 101 says '"Perhaps 
to err on the side of protection might have been more appropriate in this case and the 
enunciation of the importance of autonomy might have been saved for some other case in 
which the ability to exercise that autonomy seemed clearer." 
"'^ '. "Woman Challenges Hospital's Rights to Impose Caesarean' The Times (Monday 23rd 
September) 6. col. I .. 
Is Fully Informed Consent Possible? 
S withheld consent, but the court ordered the operation to proceed regardless. 
This is perhaps the greatest dilemma in this area. However there is also the 
problem seen in Re T whereby it is sometimes hard to ascertain whether or not 
consent was given, and the ambits o f that consent, or whether the circumstances 
surrounding the consent should make it void. In other words, it may seern'that 
because a patient is never informed o f every single aspect o f his condition and 
because he is always slightly influenced by his experiences, he can never give 
fiilly informed consent. From this premise.it could be argued that consent is an 
unworthy goal because it can never be fully attained. However, an application o f 
Dworkin's definition o f autonomy proves this to be a false assumption, and 
reaffirms the importance o f informed consent. 
Again the two sides o f consent can be separated. Edwards and Graber 
point them out: 
"Consent fails to be voluntary to the extent that it is manipulated by 
external forces ... To the extent that one's decision is less than fully 
voluntary, it falls away from ful l autonomy ... Similarly, lack o f 
information impairs rational^^ autonomy. In order to be a lcm> unto 
oneself, one's decisions must relate fundamental life-plans to the facts 
o f the situation at hand. But, to the extent that persons are unaware o f 
some of the facts ... then they will be unable to compare these to their 
life-plans."" 
At first sight this appears to conflict with Dworkin's view o f autonomy, for it 
seems to demand that autonomy requires more than a consideration o f personal 
desires. Hence an individual can act autonomously in consenting to treatment 
even i f he refuses to listen to the physicians explanation of the treatment, 
provided that this course o f action corresponds to his considered desire. 
However, the patient who is forced to make a decision as to whether to consent 
""^. By 'rational' Edwards and Graber do not mean objective rationality, but that the individual 
is able to consider various options (in other words this is similar to Dworkin's first and higher-
order desires distinction). 
Rem B. Edwards and Glenn C. Graber. Bioethics (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers, 1988). 113. 
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to treatment usually requires information as to the consequences of that decision. 
Such an individual cannot act autonomously unless he is given that required 
information. It could be argued that since the patient wi l l rarely attain full 
knowledge o f his condition, he is never truly informed when making a decision. 
However, full knowledge is unnecessary, for as Dworkin so clearly enunciated, 
all that is needed is enough knowledge for the individual to make a considered 
preference of his first and higher-order desires, Hence each individual will make 
different demands o f the physician before his thirst for information is satiated.'^ 
The other side of consent involves the appearance of consent (in other 
words, whether consent was actually given; whether any factors vitiate it; and 
whether consent should be, or was overridden in the face of competing interests). 
Again, this is based on autonomy, and the revelations o f the first chapter show 
that though an individual is never free from influence, this does not prevent him 
from making an autonomous decision.^'' 
The courts are aware of the fact that informed consent can never be 'fiall'. 
Lord Staughton in Re T (Aduh: refusal o f medical treatment) said: 
See page 19. 
However, some claim that an objective standard is useful in some circumstances. Hence 
Agneta Sutton, Prenatal Diagnosis: Confronting the Ethical Issues. (London: The Linacre 
Centre for the Study of the Ethics of Health Care, 1990), 162, believes that an autonomous 
decision requires all the facts. When concerning decisions as to foetal treatment this, she 
claims, involves information on foetal life and development and discussions on humanity and 
the perceived rights of the foetus before such a decision is properly informed. However, it has 
already been noted that a decision can be autonomous even when every possible fact is not 
made known to the recipient. He needs enough to enable an evaluation of his first and higher-
order desires, and no more. 
Yet the doctrine of consent is often criticised on the basis that we are never free of 
influence. As Frithjof Bergman On Being Free (Notre Dame and London; University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977), 72 says: 
"'One standard philosophical formulation says that a choice is free if 1 possessed all the relevant 
information, and was not subjected to (irrational) methods of persuasion and are not under 
duress. This can be rejected; ... we never do possess all the relevant information, and we are 
never only influenced by rational arguments (even the most rational argument is advanced by a 
person, and not even his tone of voice can be completely separated from the 'rational' weight 
of his reasons) and we are above all never free from all duress. Every choice has its 
consequences, and we always make a choice under certain kinds of pressure. ... though we do 
speak of degrees of freedom, the word 'free' all the same suggests a division, which in these 
terms cannot be drawn. ... [Further] a threat does not render me 'unfree'... A threat simply 
raises the cost of some action 1 might take ' 
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"Every decision is made as a result, of some influence: a patient's 
decision to consent to an operation will normally be influenced by the 
surgeon's advice as to what will happen if the operation does not take 
place. 
In the same way as Dworkin, the courts are willing to accept that though a 
decision is never free from influence, it can represent a valid personal 
determination that is worth protecting. 
a)What Constitutes Incompetence? 
But this all depends on the patient being deemed competent to make the 
decision, and it could be argued that the pregnant woman who does not desire 
to save her foetus is in some way incompetent (though such an argument is not 
accepted here). For example, Komrad maintains that "... all illness represents a 
state of diminished a u t o n o m y . H e said this because an ill person is not his 
normal self and his reasoning is impaired by a desire to end, or cope with the 
illness. Could it be said that because illness diminishes autonomy, autonomy is 
not valuable and decisions would be better made by the physicians on behalf of 
the patient? Could pregnancy be placed in the same category as illness for such 
purposes? 
Edwards and Graber put forward the theory that the primary good is the 
well-being of the patient, and that the well-being of the patient may best be 
served by the physician making the decision on the patient's behalf They 
suggest that patient welfare is the ultimate goal, and that this may best be 
preserved through paternalism. They even suggest that this could be the best way 
to secure the autonomy of the individual in the long term.*''Edwards and Graber, 
" . R e T o p . cit.,669. 
'A defence of Medical Paternalism: Ma.ximising Patient's Autonomj'' Journal of Medical 
Ethics 9 (March 1983), 1. Note that tliere is no suggestion here that pregnancy is an illness. 
This section involves a general appraisal of informed consent. See also Zbigniew Szawarski 
'Presumption of Incompetence' in D.W. Hodgkinson. A.J. Gray, B. Dalai, P. Wilson, Z. 
Szawarski, T. Sensky, G. Gillett and D.VV. Yates, 'Doctors' Legal Position in Treating 
Temporarily Incompetent Patients' British Medical Journal 31 (July 1995), 115 at 117. 
''^ Edwards and Graber merely put fonvard this theorv', they do not support it, and believe 
ultimately that informed consent is a worthy doctrine. 
''^ Edwards and Graber, op. cit., 115. 
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however, contend that i f the patient's consent is not fully informed and free 
from all influence then autonomy is unworthy as a goal. 
Dworkin, on the other hand, believes that the key lies in the patient being 
able to arrive at a considered decision. He does not demand that all the 
physician's knowledge is passed on the pa t i en t . In other words, that first, 
autonomy is so important that we must give the patient the opportunity of 
practising it and that second, informed consent usually presents that opportunity 
to an acceptable degree. One of the main reasons for the particular significance 
of autonomy in the medical context, is that our bodies are of such importance to 
us that we should be able to stop others invading them. "My body is me, failure 
to respect my wishes concerning it is a particularly insulting denial of 
autonomy."^^ Therefore, on Dworkin's analysis strong paternalism (taking away 
the patient's option of consent/^ cannot be justified merely on the grounds that 
the patient's autonomy is diminished through his illness. It is wrong to hold that 
merely by virtue of being pregnant, autonomy can be removed. 
However, incompetence has not been accurately defined by the. courts in 
England. Where a case arises where the patient seems incompetent, the issue 
before the court is usually the nature of treatment that he should receive rather 
than whether or not he is actually incompetent (which is usually a matter of 
expert opinion). Elizabeth Roberts examines the case and statute law in this area 
and suggests that where the law does touch the issue of incompetence, three 
main factors are, rightly or wrongly, used.^ ^ The first, she terms 'understanding 
G. Dworkin op. cit., 109. 
G. Dvvorkin op. cit.. 112 This is not to say that Dworkin places autonomy on a higher plain 
than the well-being of the patient (or other values such as dignity, health, integrit)' and 
security). Indeed he recognises that: "If denial of autonomy is justified in terms if promoting 
the benefit of my body, then paternalism would seem to have the strongest claim in the medical 
context." p l l 2 Hence he recognises that there are situations when informed consent is 
undesirable. These include emergency, incompetence and waiver. In other circumstances, 
autonomy is usually of sufficient importance to outweigh competing values. 
P.H. Schuck 'Rethinking Informed Consent' (January 1994) \07> The Yale Law Journal 
899-960 at 924 also says: "The more private the choice - that is. the more it concerns the 
integrity of the individual's own projects and self-conception and the less is directly effects 
others - the more robust this right should be." 
. Strong and weak paternalism are further defined and considered on page 55. 
Elizabeth Roberts op. cit.. 99. 
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information'. For example, by ss. 57 and 58, of the Mental Health Act 1983 the 
patient must by 'capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effect' 
of the proposed treatment. Roberts is critical of using this test alone, for she 
claims that the patient should also understand the risks, benefits and effects of a 
refusal to consent before he be deemed competent. The second category she 
deems 'mental stability and maturity' which is similar to the Gillick test for 
children (only here it is applied to adults). The final category is 'reasonableness 
of the decision'. This aspect of the competence test is expressly denied in Re T. 
and is something that any believer in autonomy would refuse to sanction. 
However, Roberts recognises that though it is an undesirable category, it is still 
employed by some physicians. To say that a pregnant woman is incompetent 
because her decision to refijse foetal surgery or a Caesarean section (which is 
necessary to save the life of the foetus and / or her own life) is 
incomprehensible to the reasonable man, does not fit with the autonomy 
viewpoint. This is because the objective good of the decision is irrelevant in a 
coiisideration of an individual's personal preferences.*^ 
Choice and Autonomy 
Hence, even if the patient's capacity for autonomy is diminished by virtue of his 
illness, autonomy is still valuable to him. It would be a mistake to assume that 
•autonomy is less valuable merely because it cannot be procured, for it is the 
opportunity to be autonomous that is important. This is all that the law can 
provide, the rest is up to the individual. Legally the individual can be granted 
greater opportunity to be autonomous by giving the individual a choice in a 
given area. For example, telling the pregnant woman that she can have her baby 
at home or in hospital will not predetermine an autonomous decision on her 
behalf, because she cannot be forced to compare her first and higher-order 
desires and make an autonomous, decision. It may not even give her the 
opportunity to be autonomous if she wants to bear the child in the local 
swimming pool, for neither option represent her considered desire. However, 
This was one of the underlying rationales of G. Dworkin's theorv' of autonomy. See page 
18. 
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taking away that choice and demanding that she have her baby in hospital takes 
away the opportunity for autonomy unless it happens to match her considered 
desire. Hence, an autonomous decision always involves an internal choice 
between preferences. As Lord Donaldson MR, said in Re T: 
"Just because adults have the right to choose, it does not follow that 
they have in fact exercised that right. Determining whether or not they 
have done so is a quite different and sometimes difficult matter. And if 
it is clear that they have exercised their right of choice, problems can 
still arise in determining what precisely they have chosen. This appeal 
illustrates both these problems."™ 
State granted options do not create autonomy, but they do enhance the 
opportunity for autonomous action. 
Challenges to Autonomy: Paternalism and Patient Welfare 
In this section challenges to the view that autonomy is the primary goal are 
acknowledged. First the value of autonomy is considered and it is suggested that 
autonomy has both intrinsic and extrinsic value. Following this, cases of 
instrumentally disadvantageous choices are examined (such as .when the burden 
of responsibility is hard to bear). Because autonomy is not possible or even 
desirable in eyery instant, the advantages of paternalism are then considered and 
it is asked when coercion in general, and coercion of the pregnant woman are 
justifiable. 
a) The Value of Autonomy 
I f autonomy is the main rationale behind informed consent, the value of 
autonomy must be considered. McCormick argues that autonomy has extrinsic 
valuable and therefore i f a better result could be achieved without it, it should 
not be used: 
"A moral right is always with regard to a good. The good in question is 
self-determination in the acceptance or rejection of medical treatment. 
This self-deterrtiination ... is a conditional or instrumental good - that 
is, it is a good precisely insofar as it is the instrument whereby the 
best interests of the patient are served by it. If, for example, the best 
70 . Rc T op. cit.. 652. 
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over-all good of patients would be better achieved without self-
determination, it would be senseless to speak of self-determination as a 
right."'' 
Young,'^ on the other hand, believes that autonomy has more than mere 
instrumental value. He uses, as an example, the scenario of the famous novel 
Brave New World by Aldous Huxley, in which the characters were content but 
were not autonomous. The rationale of the book is that the vital autonomy was 
missing from their lives and that being content was not enough, for they desired 
to be the authors of that contentfnent. Skinner illustrates this point: "Autonomy -
the business of genuinely choosing and acting so as to forge one's own lot in life 
- is an excellence which contributes to personal dignity and self esteem."'^  Hence 
Young believes that autonomy has intrinsic value: 
"According to this position, autonomy is part of the moral basis of 
personhood To the extent that .^ person is at the mercy of his (or her) 
ui'ges or impulses, or lacks scope for actively placing and then 
achieving goals and purposes, it is the person's circumstances, not the 
person himself (or herself), that governs. Accordingly the person's life 
lacks self-direction."^'' 
Even a prisoner of war could be autonomous; being able to think for oneself is 
enough because " ... to the extent that we are able-to shape our lives in ways 
that we consider worthwhile, our self-esteem will be enhanced."'^  
Hence, there is much to be said for Young's belief that autonomy can be 
instrumentally valuable, but that its primary value is intrinsic.'*' Hence in Re S. S 
Richard McCormick How Brave a New World? Dilemmas in Bioethics (London: S C M 
Press Ltd., 1981), 359. Note that Edwards and Graber criticised informed consent on the same 
grounds. This view \vould not stand up to the demands set at the beginning of this thesis 
because the theory is not legally applicable; it would create flirther uncertainty. This chapter 
ascertains that though there are circumstances when autonomy is trying for the pregnant 
woman, it is valuable because the law must create a clear cut division between when it will 
support her autonomy and when it will sacrifice it for other values. 
R. Young Personal Autonomy: Bevond Negative and Positive Liberty (New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1986). 
B .F . Skinner Bevond Freedom and Dignity (London, 1972). 
' Young op. cit., 25. 
^\ Young ibid.. 
50 
wished to refiase the blood transfijsion, a course which the surgeon feU would 
result in her own and the foetus' death. The value of life is extremely high, and 
hence this situation is not desirable. However, even if after the Caesarean she 
had been thankfial for the overruling of her refiisal to consent, it is still 
undesirable that her autonomy was overruled, because autonomy has value in 
itself 
It has been acknowledged that sometimes choice is not desirable to a patient, 
but the scenarios that give rise to this conclusion have yet to be examined. This 
section is to fialfil that role: to consider the claim that patient welfare is more 
important than autonomy or that a choice is instrumentally bad in a given 
situation. As H.L. A. Hart says: 
"Choice may be made or consent given without adequate reflection or 
appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely transitory 
desires; or in various predicaments when the judgement is likely to be 
clouded; or under inner psychological compulsion; or under pressure 
from others of a kind too subtle to be susceptible of proof in a law 
court. Underlying Mill's extreme fear of paternalism there is perhaps a 
conception of what a normal human being is like which now seems not 
to correspond to the facts."''^ 
In Re S, the purpose of the court-ordered Caesarean was to protect the foetus 
rather than to protect the welfare of the woman, but it should be noted that 
decisions made by the pregnant woman are especially hard by virtue of the fact 
that the foetus is affected and hence it could be claimed that the welfare of the 
woman particulariy demands strong paternalism in this area (though this claim 
will be rejected). 
Yet. according to Young, there are two models of the intrinsic value standpoint. The first is 
extrapolated by G . E . Moore Principia Ethica (Oxford, 1903), who believes that autonomy is 
intrinsically valuable for its own sake; hence it has value even when there is no valuer to value 
it. Young prefers the second opinion, which has previously been contended by C.I . Lewis The 
Theory of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois. 1946). This is the view that autonomy 
is intrinsically valuable only if it is worth having for its own sake. 
Law. Liberty and Morals (London: Oxford University Press. 1963), 34. 
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b) The Burden of Responsibility 
When giving the patient the right to decide certain factors concerning his 
treatment, the patient is in fact forced to make a choice (even i f it is the choice to 
delegate responsibility to another, or to toss a coin). The patient may 
occasionally desire not to have a choice, because, as Dworkin notes, with 
choice comes responsibility (be it legal responsibility or the social need to 
conform): "In addition to bearing the responsibility in one's own mind, there 
arises the possibility of being held responsible."'^ And, Capron says: 
" ... autonomy is centrally associated with the notion of individual 
responsibility. The freedom to make decisions for oneself carries with it 
the obligation to answer for the consequences of those decisions."'^ 
Dworkin gives the example of a pregnant woman who decides to use 
amniocentesis to screen for Downs Syndrome. The Abortion Act 1967 
recognises that should the foetus be so afflicted, abortion would be an option. 
Once she has consented to the amniocentesis and heard the results, she and her 
partner are responsible for bringing the child into the worid (or aborting). "The 
defective child, i f they choose to have it, can no longer be viewed as bad luck or 
a curse or an act of God."^ ** 
The doctrine of informed consent demands that even if an individual 
autonomously decides to do exactly what the physician tells him (as has been 
deterrnine;d to be quite synonymous with autonomy), he still bears responsibility 
for decisions made by the physician. In this way it can be seen that a choice can 
be onerous. Michael Bayles,**' on the other hand, puts forward the theory that 
the more extensive our choices the more content we are. This is firstly because 
the greater the number of alternatives, the lower the risk of being dissatisfied and 
secondly because our actions express our character and desires, and the more 
G. Dworkin. op. cit., 68. 
A . M . Capron, 'Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment' (Dec. 
1974) 123 The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 356. 
G: Dworkin. op. cit,, 67. 
Principles of Legislation (Detroit. 1978). 
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options we have, the better we can express ourselves. However, such claims 
are subject to criticism. Young**^  comments on Bayles' first point, saying that 
mere proliferation of choices does not as such promote autonomy (as has been 
previously noted) and on the second point, he answers that often the greater the 
number of choices, the more agonising the choice is to make. 
Yet, the responsibility that the patient is forced to bear is minimal, for though 
he must determine who to delegate the decision to, he need not make the actual 
decision. He can autonomously appoint an agent, or he can reject the 
opportunity of autonomy, hence he need not accept responsibility for the whole 
decision. He need only accept responsibility for his choice of agent, or for his 
decision to toss a coin to decide his fate. Further, there are ways of helping the 
patient come to a decision. For example Lilford and Thornton refer to the 
'expected utility theory' .This is the belief that there is an overall best decision 
that has 'the greatest prospective chance of maximising utility'. Factors, such as 
the safety of the pregnant woman; the safety of the foetus; the long-term health 
of the baby; and the psychological health of the parents,^ '' contribute to the 
decision as to how to advise the woman to act. 
In this way the physician can. allow the patient to reach her own decision, 
and also advise her as to the outcome of the various alternatives, so aiding the 
decision process. The flaw in the 'expected utility theory' is that it may take a 
great deal of time to evaluate the necessary considerations. However, it is 
certainly a valuable way of helping a patient who is fearfiil of making the difficult 
choice alone, and still protecting his autonomy to some degree. 
This still leaves the patient with important choices to make which, despite 
the help, he may find burdensome. However, this minimal amount of forced 
choice is better placed with the patient than with the physician, for the intrinsic 
' Y o u n g op. cit., 27. 
Richard J. Lilford and James G. Thornton "Making Difficult Decisions' in T. Chard and 
M.P.M. Richards (eds.) op. cit.. 105. 
This list is supplied by Lilford and Richards ibid.. 
value of autonomy sufficiently outweighs the bad effects of the limited 
responsibility. 
c) The Particular Choice is Immoral. 
Dworkin also recognises that choice may be negative per se. He gives the 
example of the bad effect that would be created by allowing people to purchase 
exemption from subscription to the army. The existence of this choice, he 
claims, is immoral. Just because the individual could refuse to exercise the choice 
does not make it acceptable. In this instance, the moral significance is in the 
choice itself rather than in whether or not it is exercised. Hence, the mere 
existence of a choice can be bad even though it need not be exercised, for the 
temptation to exercise may be so strong, and the result so wrong that it is better 
that the choice never existed^ However, the value of informed consent (as a 
choice) has been expounded and is not in question hence the granting of this 
choice to pregnant women is not immoral in this sense. 
Though Dworkin does not view choice as intrinsically valuable, he does 
believe that "What does have intrinsic value, is not having choices but being 
recognised as the kind o f creature capable of making choices.''^ * This lends more 
suppoil to the to the case of the pregnant woman, especially as she should not be 
separated from other citizens into a group which is deemed incapable of making 
choices, merely by virtue of the fact that she is pregnant. 
Therefore even though there will be occasions when the pregnant woman will 
deem other values more highly than autonomy, she has the chance to reject the 
opportunity of autonomy, and the appropriate aids should be at hand to act in her 
best interests should she so need them." However, the opportunity to be 
autonomous should remain present. 
G. Dworkin op. cil.. 75. 
. G. Dworkih op. cit., 78. 
See Alister Campbell 'Dependency Revisited; the Limits of Autonomy in Medical Ethics' in 
Margaret Brazier and Mary Lobjoit (eds.) Protecting the Vulnernhle: Autonomy and Consent in 
H_calth Care (London; Routledge. 1991), 110 who claims that often the patient requires love 
and protection rather than autonomy. Note that for Dworkin, love and protection arc not 
incompatible with autonomy; Dworkin op. cit.. 108. 
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d) Paternalism 
In a society with a government there will inevitably be areas where the 
government acts in a paternalistic manner in order to protect the weaker 
members of society. This rheans that choice will be limited, and in respect of 
values such as autonomy the limitation of choice must be legitimate. Dworkin 
suggests that the appropriate maxim for liiriiting choice is as follows: "A decent 
respect for autonomy of individuals will lead- us to be very wary of limiting 
choices even when it is in the rational self-interest of the individuals 
coneerned."^^ Hence, though a woman may believe that were she to fall 
pregnant, she would like to give up smoking tobacco, it would not mean that 
she would welcome the law that prohibits her from smoking. 
The problem is neatly outlined by Sir Norman Anderson: 
"The competing interests of contemporary life are, moreover, so 
diverse and interdependent that an ever increasing intervention by the 
law seems inevitable. The basic problem is ... how to maintain a proper 
balance between individual liberty and law control."^^ 
According to J. Areen et. al., this balance can be achieved by basing paternalism 
on a mixture of concern for others; concern for the individual; and concern for 
those who cannot decide for themselves. ^ 
Moreover, it has been seen that choice is fiot always the best solution to a 
problem, hence it must be controlled. Paternalism (often seen as the antithesis 
to freedom and autonomy) is necessary to ensure that the individual's freedom is 
not compromised unduly by the freedom of the next individual. "The red light 
88 
89 
G. Dworkin op. cit., 77. 
. Law. Liberty and Justice (London: Stevens and Sons, 1978), 7. 
J. Areen. P. A. King, S: Goldberg and A.M. Capron , Law. Science and Medicine (Mineola, 
New York: Foundation Press. 1984). 415. 
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which I have to obey keeps fifty others out of my way for every time it forces me 
to stop."" 
Paternalism, according to Young, can take two forms. Strong paternalism 
is "intervention to protect or benefit a person, despite that person's informed and 
voluntary denial of consent to the paternalistic, measures proposed."^^ Weak 
paternalism: 
". . involves interference where there is (or is believed to be) a defect 
in the decision making capacities of the person interfered with, or 
where it is necessary to ascertain whether the person's behaviour is 
fiilly reflective."^' 
Weak paternalism is thought to be more justifiable than the strong version. Re T 
is of the former kind, because the judges believed that the mother unduly 
influenced the daughter's decision to refiise a blood transfiision. Re S, on the 
other hand is an example of strong paternalism, and, as a result, is all the more 
worrying. 
In the first chapter it was noted that J.S. Mill demands certain features of a 
state before he considers an individual to be free. Mill believes that weak 
paternalism is justifiable and will actually enhance freedom (for example limiting 
the right of an individual to sell himself into slavery). Young on the other hand 
sees neither strong nor weak paternalism as, compatible with autonomy (unless 
that paternalism is consented to as in Dworkin's example of Odysseus 
commanding his men to ignore his orders until the ship passed the Sirens.^ '') 
However, even if autonomy and patertialism are incompatible, other values 
will occasionally prove more important than autonomy.^ ^ The argument here is 
that the pregnant woman's reftisal of medical intervention is not one of those 
circumstances. A balance must be sought, as Mark Siegler points out: 
Bergman, op. cit., 187. 
Young, op. cil.. 64. 
Young ibid.. 
G. Dworkin op. cit.. J4. 
' \ Sec further page 64. 
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"The principle of respect for autonomy surely recognises that different 
autonomous individuals will wish to be treated in different ways by the 
health professional ... The critical question ... [is how] morally 
conscientious physicians and patients .... determine where on a 
spectrum of paternalism / consumerism or dependence / independence 
their professional relationship will and ought to be stabilised."^^ 
e) What is Coercion? 
Paternalism involves the balancing of considerations. Inevitably, rules will be 
necessary to allow certain actions and prohibit others. This will in turn involve 
restraint (refiasing to allow an individual to act in a particular way) and coercion 
(forcing a person to act in a particular way). Coercion is less likely to be 
tolerated for it constitutes the intrusion of an individual's autonomy. Hence, in 
the distinction between forcing treatment upon the pregnant woman and 
refiasing her that treatment the latter constitutes a greater infringement of 
autonomy. Further, by drawing the line at strong paternalism (coercion), so 
allowing only weak paternalism, the pregnant woman's rights remain balanced 
with other women's rights. Strong paternalism can then be largely reserved for 
those who are mentally incompetent. Even though there will be instances when 
the woman wishes that the choice of whether or not to consent to treatment is 
not hers, it is still desirable that the legal line is drawn here to prevent injustices 
to the majority of pregnant woman. 
However, the term, 'coercion' is more complicated than may seem to be the 
ease. Bosanquet, who speaks from the positive liberty perspective, defines 
coercion (or constraint) in the following way: "It is constraint when my mind is 
interfered with in its control of my body, either by actijal or threatening physical 
violence in the direction of another mind." He also recognises that constraint is 
not a clear cut. term; "A man can be a long way more than a slave and yet a long 
M. Siegler 'Search for Moral Certainty in medicine: a Proposal for a New Model of the 
Doctor-PalieiU Encounter' Bulletin New York Academy of Medicine 57 (Jan. - Feb. 1981), 56-
69, as quoted by Mark S. Komrad "A Defence of Medical Paternalism: Ma.ximising Patient's 
Autonomy' in Rem B. Edwards and Glenn C. Grabcr op. cit.. 144. 
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way less than a citizen."^'' Clearly, however, the Re S situation falls within his 
definition. According to Harry- Frankfijrt "A person who is coerced is 
compelled to do what he does, for he has no choice but to do it."^^ I f the force 
does not come up to that standard then there is no absolution from moral 
responsibility. There is not, says Frankfijrt, an objective standard to coercion, but 
the person in question must have no other choice but to act in a given way: 
"It requires that the victim of a threat should have no alternative to 
submission, in a sense in which this implies not merely that the person 
would act reasonably in submitting and therefore is not to be blamed 
for submitting, but rather that he is not morally responsible for his 
submissive action."^^ 
Hence, the, reasonableness of his action is irrelevant. Frankfiirt gives the 
example of a person who sees a spider in the corner of the room and bums the 
building to prevent it coming into contact with his face. This constitutes 
coercion. In this way coercion is subjective for it depends on the character of the 
individual, The pregnant woman may feel that if the physician recommends a 
course of action she has absolutely no choice but to .follow his recommendation. 
Such a situation will prove extremely rare, for few of us feel so compelled by 
mere advise. However, it is important to recognise that this is one instance 
. when coercion is a necessary evil in our attempt to nurture the opportunity to be 
autonomous. For the physician's advice is one of the components of informed 
consent without which a decision by the pregnant woman cannot be truly 
autonomous. Though it seems strange that the very information that can make a 
decision autonomous for one woman can make it a coerced decision for another, 
this fits entirely with Dworkin's concept of autonomy. Again, all the law can do 
is to create the greatest opportunity for autonomous decisions and this can be 
Both quotes appear in The Philosophical Theor\' of the State (London: Macmillan, 1951), 
125. 
Harr>' G. Frankfurt 'Coercion and Moral Responsibility' in Ted Honderich (ed.) Essavs on 
Freedom of Action (London: Kegan Paul. 1973). 63. 
Frankfurt op. cit., 77. 
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best achieved by the physician advising the patient and then allowing her to 
decide whether or not to consent. 
f) When is Coercion Justified? 
Christian Bay calls coercion "the supreme political evil."'"*^ Similarly H.L.A. Hart 
finds it abhorrent: 
" I shall advance the thesis that i f there are any moral rights as all, it 
follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men 
to be free.""" 
J.S. Mill concentrates specifically on the question 'when is constraint justified?'. 
He does not advocate constraint for the person's own good, because he is of the 
view that we are each the best guardians of our own health, but nevertheless, he 
advocates constraint in the following circumstances: 
" ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or 
collectively interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number 
is self-protection; that the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against 
his will is to prevent harm to others."" '^^  
Hence, in the same way that this thesis has proposed that autonomy is not a 
universal good, but has intrinsic value. Mill believes that even i f the good of the 
individual is best served by interference with his liberty, that interference should 
not be tolerated. It is only for the sake of 'others' that liberty should be 
compromised. In other words, to curb the liberty of an individual is wrong 
because it is his right to be free. But to curb the liberty of a .society in order that 
the general good of that society will be forthcoming, is acceptable. 
Even i f we were to decide that coercion is inherently bad, there is a 
possibility that its use could nevertheless be justified by applying the 'Principle of 
Double Effect'. By this principle, a distinction is made between what is directly 
The Structure of Freedom (Stanford, California: Staiiford University Press, 1958), 92. 
"". 'Are There Any Natural Rights?' Philosophical Review 64 (1955), 174. 
102 
. On Liberty (O.\ford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), 5. 
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and indirectly willed. A greater evil is avoided by practising a lesser evil. 
According to McCormick, there are four conditions to follow before the 
doctrine can be applied: 
"(1) The action froin which evil results is good or indifference in itself, 
it is not morally evil. (2) the intention of the agent is upright - that is, 
the evil effect is sincerely not intended. (3) The evil effect must be 
equally immediate casually with the good effect, for otherwise it would 
be a means to the good effect and would be intended. (4) There must 
be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the evil to occur."'"^ 
McCormick uses this method to justify the killing of a foetus to save the 
pregnant woman who has cancer when the foetus and the woman would both 
have died without the operation. 
Would the Re S situation fall within the Doctrine of Double Effect? A 
Caesarean operation is not inherently evil; it is often used with good intentions 
(though the coercion of the woman could possibly be classed as inherently evil). 
The intention is to save the foetus and the coercion is equally immediate casually 
with the saving of the foetus but it is anyone's argument as to whether coercion 
of the woman is less evil than allowing the foetus to die or suffer. It seems 
unlikely that the Principle of Double Effect would be usefiil in the majority of 
situations, especially with regard to the woman's right to refiise to act in the 
best interests of the foetus. It is also true that the theory is dependant on a 
decision as to what is morally evil, which is a complex (and probably 
unanswerable) question indeed. 
Coercion is necessary for the exceptional circumstances such as the necessity to 
imprison offenders who pose a sufficient threat to society. It has no place in the 
maternity ward (except in the very limited scenario outlined by Frankfiart) and 
that the courts in America and now in England have resorted to it in order to 
force the pregnant woman to bow to an objective set of values concerning the 
value of the foetus, is abhorrent. Restraint is a sufficient weapon to protect the 
foetus, for to remove from the woman, by virtue of her pregnancy, the 
"^ ^ MeCormickop. c i l , 413. 
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opportunity to be autonomous in a hospital setting that would (supposedly) 
honour the wishes of every other patient, must not be tolerated. 
The view that coercion must not be used against the woman in a way that 
leads to any gross inequality between her and the rest of society, is contended 
(from an American perspective) by Dawn Johnsen: 
"By creating an adversarial relationship between the woman and her 
fetus, the state provides itself with a powerful means for controlling 
women's behaviour during pregnancy, thereby threatening women's 
fundamental rights. A woman's right to bodily autonomy in matters 
concerning reproduction is protected by the constitutional guarantees 
of liberty and privacy. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws should be interpreted to 
prohibit the state form using women's reproductive capability to their 
detriment."'"'' 
Johnsen gives examples of American decisions where this warning has not been 
heeded. Hence in Grodin v. Grodin'"^. a child sued his mother for taking 
tetracycline whilst pregnant, for this resulted in the discoloration of his teeth and 
in Curlander v. Bio-Science Laboratories"^^, the court hinted at the possibility of 
a claim of wrongful birth when a woman failed to abort a severely defective 
foetus and the child went on to suffer pain. Johnsen also points out that the 
criminal law on child abuse has been extended to cover the abuse of the foetus, 
and, most patently, injunctions against pregnant women have been actualised. 
Hence, though the foetus cannot be made a ward of court in England and Wales 
(Re F (in Utero)'"') it can in certain state of America, and, as previously 
noted, there is some sympathy for the cause in England.'^^ Also, as Johnsen 
"^ ^ Dawn E . Johnsen 'The Creation of fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection', (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 578, at 579. 
102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W. 2d 869 (1980). 
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rplr. 477 (1980). 
[1988] 2 All E .R . 193. 
Johnsen refers to Chicago Trib., Apr. 9, 1984, at I , col. 4 and Boston Globe, April 27, 
1983, at 8, col. l . op. cit,. 584. 
. Sec page 33. 
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pointed out, in the American case Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital V. Anderson"", a woman objecting to a blood transfusion on religious 
grounds was nevertheless forced to undergo one for the sake of her foetus, and a 
woman wishing to avoid Caesarean delivery was coerced into one.'" Johnsen is 
convinced that these concessions to the foetus will continue to expand due to the 
physical dependence of the foetus on the woman. She is worried that the 
coercion used in these, perhaps, extreme cases, could easily be extended. 
At present in England, breach of informed consent does not usually vitiate 
consent, but can lead to an action in battery or negligence. Injury to the foetus 
only leads to a claim i f the foetus is born and survives for forty-eight hours. Yet 
in America not only tort law, but criminal and family law are involved in the 
protection of the foetus. (Though note that the criminal law can be used here if 
the foetus is bom and survives 48 hours). The possibility that the English courts 
are following the same course remains to be tested in the recent legal action 
against a hospital who forced a pregnant woman to undergo a Caesarean 
operation for the sake of the foetus.' 
Conclusion 
The education and information a pregnant woman receives before making a 
decision as to treatment is essential, however the law has access to limited 
action in this respect. What it can do, is to affirm the value of autonomy by 
resisting the temptation to coerce the pregnant woman into treatment that she 
renounces. Though it may seem harsh to draw the line so firmly, legal certainty 
demands as much. The pregnant woman may have other interests that conflict 
with her interest in autonomy and these she must weigh up so that she can reject 
the opportunity to be autonomous if she so desires. However, this should be a 
decision reserved strictly for the patient. As far as the physician or the 
government is concerned, a woman's interest in autonomy (when deciding 
whether or not to consent to treatment) is an interest that outweighs the 
42 N.J. 421. 201 A. 2d 537. cerl. exel. 377 U.S. 98.5 (1964). 
"'. In Jcflerson v. Griffin SpaldinR County Hospilal 247 Ga. 86. 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per 
iiiciininii). 
Sec page 42. 
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whether or not to consent to treatment) is an interest that outweighs the 
physician's (or government's) interest in avoiding pain for the woman, or in 
reducing expenditure, or in avoiding harm to the foetus. Her opportunity to be 
autonomous is of paramount consideration. .As the recent technological advances 
become more widespread, such an affirmation will prove of extreme importance 
i f the law is not going to be taken unprepared at the expense of the pregnant 
woman's rights. 
The government's policies seem to show commitment to patient autonomy. 
For example the Patient's Charter, effective from 1 April 1992, grants every 
citizen a right to receive health care on the basis of clinical need, regardless of 
ability to pay and it promises every citizen (limited) access to his medical 
records."' Further, it promises that: 
^^Every citizen has the following National Health Service Rights ... to 
be given a clear explanation of any treatment proposed, including any 
risks and any alternatives, before you decide whether you will agree to 
the treatment 
This implies that both agreement to treatment and full information should be 
forthcoming. Yet only six months later in the landmark case Re S. the pregnant 
woman's desire to avoid a Caesarean operation was overruled in the interests of 
the foetus. Clearly the commitment to patient autonomy is not as great as the 
Charter would have us believe. Further, the standard promised in the Charter is 
misleading in that it promises what cannot possibly be delivered. The disclosure 
of 'any risks and any alternatives' clearly places an unacceptable and impossible 
burden on doctors. 
The Maternity Services Government Response to the Second Report from 
the Health Committee, Session 1991-1992 on Maternity Services re-iterates the 
need for informed consent, with special reference to the pregnant woman, saying 
at paragraph three: 
" \ Department of Health The Patient's Charter: Raising the Standard London HMSO, 1991. 
" '. The Patient's Charter op. cit.. 8 -9. 
"The Government has a responsibility for ensuring that women receive 
the best possible maternity care. We also believe that the service must 
be sensitive to the views of those who use it, so that women are 
empowered to take decisions about their care. ... The [Patient] Charter 
makes the needs and wishes of those who use the health service 
paramount." 
I f Re S had stood alone as a one-ofF case, then the policies represented here may 
have been believable. Unfortunately the recent revelations concerning forced 
Caesarean operations throw doubt upon the intentions of the government 
concerning their respect for the autonomy of the pregnant woman. It can only be 
hoped that the recent challenges to the courts undermining of the pregnant 
woman's power to withhold consent, will prove successful. 
In the next chapter the perceived status of the foetus and its. bearing on the 
autonomy of the woman will be considered in an effort to determine the ambits 
of the woman's rights to demand treatment on her own behalf, or on behalf of 
the foetus. 
' \ London HMSO Cm 2018. 
64 
3: THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S RIGHT TO DEMAND 
TREATMENT 
Introduction 
In the second chapter it is suggested that though limitation of the pregnant 
woman's autonomy in the field of refusing medical treatment is unacceptable, 
limiting her autonomy by curbing her right to demand treatment is both 
acceptable and necessary.' The first chapter outlined the importance of 
autonomy, but G. Dworkin at no point claimed that it was the only important 
value. In fact, he expressly recognised that values such as "... health, dignity, 
well-being, [and] security ..."^ may supersede autonomy for: "To promote these 
it is sometimes necessary to limit autonomy."' The aim of this chapter is to give 
some format to the limitation of the pregnant woman's autonomy by curbing her 
rights to demand treatment. The format must be certain enough to be legally 
applicable, but liquid enough to move with the advancing technologies. 
Firstly, the status of the foetus is reviewed and it is put forward that 
arguments about the foetus being human and the protection that should result 
therefrom are defective, but that the foetus should be protected due to three 
considerations, namely; the foetal potential human status; the fact that the foetus 
is human derived; and the harmful symbolic effect a lack of foetal protection 
would have on society. 
Secondly, the question of the extent of protection that the foetus deserves 
is tackled. A broad definition of 'health' is proposed as a worthy societal goal 
(for both foetus and pregnant woman) and the famous 'Four Principles' are used 
to guide the debate.. It is important to recognise that just because autonomy is 
no longer the primary goal does not make it an unimportant consideration. It is 
'. Though the pregnant woman's autonomy is not to be ignored; it must be considered along 
side the welfare of the foetus. 
G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (from the Cambridge Studies in 
Philosophy range) (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
14. 
\ G. Dworkin ibid. 
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shown that true health cannot be achieved without a measure of autonomy as is 
reflected in the 'Four Principles' which include beneficence, non-maleficence, 
respect for autonomy and justice. In the interests of autonomy, it is desirable to 
allow many patient demands to be heeded, and in the interests of justice, it is 
desirable to ensure that women are not treated adversely due to their pregnancy. 
Hence any treatment that would be forthcoming to a non-pregnant woman 
should be made available to the pregnant woman, though risks to the foetus 
should obviously be iterated by the physician. There is also a cogent argument 
for heeding a pregnant woman's demand for abortion albeit in limited 
circumstances. 
It may seem at this point, that having decided that the foetus is indeed 
important it is granted very little protection because of the significance still 
placed on the pregnant woman. However, the distinction between the right to 
refuse treatment (which is unlimited) and the right to demand it (which is limited) 
becomes crucial when considering the modern technologies of foetal surgery and 
treatment. For these treatments are not forthcoming to all women; they are 
peculiar to pregnant women. Hence the injustice to pregnant women in refusing 
such treatments is limited. As these treatments increase in popularity and the 
technologies advance, this distinction will become increasingly important. A 
woman who wants the eye colour of her foetus changed, or the hair colour, 
height, cosmetic appearance or sex could legally and ethically be denied the 
opportunity. Already the problems with embryology have given rise to many an 
ethical dilemma'* and there are cases of foetal surgery that also give rise to 
concern.^ This chapter aims to guide the complex ethical situation in as simple a 
way as possible attempting to respect autonomy but more importantly, to 
conform to the societal goal of health for both foetus and pregnant woman. 
What is the Status of the Foetus? 
A charged debate surrounds the moral status of the foetus and no attempt will be 
made to give a grand definition that ignores the obvious divergences in societal 
'. Such as the recent case of the woman pregnant with eight foetuses. 
Sec page 80. 
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opinion, for this is not the purpose of the law. Instead some of the arguments 
are eliminated and others are praised in an attempt to compromise. 
Of the political commentators, there are two main camps; the 
conservative and liberal. The conservative view is often theological and based 
on the importance of the soul, which the foetus is said to have from conception. 
Hence abortion (and screening with a view to abortion), are considered morally 
wrong due to the 'murder' that is intended to result. Similarly, surgery and 
treatment that would be considered too risky for the born child would be equally 
wrong in the case of a foetus. Because the importation of the soul occurs at 
conception, the foetus is said to deserve protection from that point as a full 
human being. 
On the opposing side, the liberal view tends to put the well-being of the 
foetus in the hands of the pregnant woman. The foetus is said to be a part of 
the woman and therefore hers to expel or keep as she wishes. Though not 
necessarily looking from a viewpoint on medical treatment, this group tend to 
concentrate on the woman's right to equal freedom. In other words, they are 
keen to ensure that the woman is not prejudiced in any way by her pregnancy. 
Hence they do not have much to say about her right to demand treatment, 
except that she should have the same rights as other women. Even if she should 
demand abortion, there would be reason to comply so as to put her in the same 
position as other women; but i f she should demand foetal surgery to save the 
life of the foetus, the liberal perspective have little to say in her defence, 
because there is no corresponding right for unpregnant woman.^ Hence this 
group give little guidance in the field with which this chapter is concerned. 
Other groups concentrate on moral rather than political or theological grounds. 
They claim that the foetus deserves protection because it is a person, or because 
it has potential or because it is derived from humanity. 
For a full appraisal of the consen'ative and liberal viewpoints, see L.W. Sumner and 
Princeton, Abortion and Moral Theor\' (New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
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a)The Human Foetus Argument 
In this section the view that the foetus deserves protection because it is a human, 
or a person is examined and rejected. We, as humans expect certain rights, 
and it is possible to argue that the foetus has certain attributes in common with 
us and that it therefore deserves equal protection.^ Criticism of this view is 
possible because the label of human can be considered empty, in that what 
mattei's is when life is morally important rather than when it physically begins.* 
When life becomes morally important is a subjective ethical argument and 
depends on answers to the questions in the following sections, such as when 
potentiality plays a role in conferring status to an organism. However, for now 
the argument is considered that the foetus is human and deserves protection on 
this ground alone. 
I f the law conferred human status on the foetus, and made no distinction 
betvveen 'foetal humans' and 'bom humans' then despite its lack of autonomy; 
its lack of the ability or desire to self-govern, it would have rights merely by 
virtue of the fact that it is a human-being. The European Convention of Human 
Rights would apply to the foetus, and our own legislature would demand its 
rigorous protection.^ However, from an ethical perspective even i f the foetus 
is human, who is to say that its vveakness makes it the candidate for preferential 
treatment? Could it not be said with equal conviction that the woman's right 
•to autonomy is more important than the foetus' life by virtue of the fact that the 
foetus does not yet care for its life? What value is the 'human foetus' argument 
if, instead of using it to argue for equality for a// humans, one goes to great 
lengths asserting that the foetus is a human only then to demand that its rights as 
.^ See J.R. Lieberman, M. Mazor, W. Chaim and A. Cohen 'After Office Hours; The Fetal 
RiglU to Live' Obstetrics and Gvnaecolog\'. 53 (1979). 515. Also see Baruch Brody Abortion 
and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View (Mass, USA; MIT Press, 1976), chapter 
2. 
^ See John Harris The Value of Life: and Introduction to Medical Ethics (London and Boston: 
Routiedge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 14. 
The European Convention treats humans thus because of a respect for the sanctity of human 
life. Sce.Jonathon Glover Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin Books. 1977), 
chapter .1. 
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a human are different from the pregnant woman's rights as a human? In saying 
that woman and foetus are hiiman and concluding that the foetus is the weaker 
human (and therefore deserved of better protection), the proponents of the 
argument leave themselves defenceless against the argument that the woman 
should get the greatest protection by virtue of being stronger! 
Hence one argument aga:inst the 'human foetus' argument is that it affords 
no firm conclusions i f human and foetus are then said to be unequal, for the 
question of how to treat the foetus once it is accorded human status depends on 
the perspective from which it is viewed. Utilitarians follow the course that 
creates the most good, natural rights theorist advocate minimum state 
intervention, liberal theorists prevent overzealous paternalism and deontologists 
follow what they believe is the 'right' course irrespective of outcome. Hence, 
even i f it is said to be human, the possible corollaries that flow from the 
assumption are endless. This makes the argument legally inapplicable.'" 
The final criticism is that if foetus and woman are equal, the infringement 
of autonomy that the woman will suffer for the sake of the foetus is out of 
proportion with the infringement of autonomy that she will suffer for the sake of 
other human beings (by virtue of the fact that the foetus is a part of her). Though 
Brody says that there is no duty to save the human, he believes that there is a 
duty not to harm him. On this view, all the acts in-between harm and killing, 
(such a abuse, bodily harm and addiction) would become illegal. This would 
mean that the woman, who is also a human, could not possibly expect to have 
her human rights respected i f the foetus is also labelled a human. I f her human 
rights are to suffer, then why should the foetal human rights not suffer to a 
similar degree, and hence we arrive back at the first criticism of the human 
foetus debate; that if both woman and foetus cannot claim fijll and equal human 
rights, then there is little point in the label human. In short, legal human right 
are simply inapplicable to the foetus. 
Note, however, that rejection of this argument does not . prevent protection of the foetus, for 
it can be protected on grounds other than humanhood. See Lcanord Glantz "Is the Foetus a 
Human? A Lawyers View' in Bondeson, Engelhardt, Spicker and Winship Abortion and the 
Status of the Fetus (New York: Reidel, 1983) 107. 
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If the foetus is to be protected, it must be on the grounds that follow; that they 
are derived from humans and are potentially human. That they are something 
apart that have no desires, no feelings, but must be protected for what they 
may become and, of equal importance, what they are to society." 
b) The Argument form Potential 
The potential of the foetus to become human is a valid ground on which to base 
the protection of the foetus. However, within the argument there are two 
possible camps, both of which offer some guidance in the protection owed to 
the foetus, though the latter camp offers the more concrete grounds. 
Of the two camps, the first involves the claim that from some point in the 
production of the child, the foetus suddenly becomes worthy of protection by 
virtue of its potential to become human. Though this view usually concerns a 
particular point in gestation. Lord Immanuel Jakovits (speaking from the Jewish 
perspective) believes that though fiiU human status does not occur until birth, 
the potential for being human should be respected even before conception. 
Hence the seed must not be wasted because the sole purpose of procreation is 
the production of children. As the potential grows (as gestation continues) so the 
respect owed to the foetus is increased. 
Most claim that the specific point in gestation from which potentiality 
becomes important, is conception. As a child is giveil protection and valued 
highly, they argue, so too the foetal potential for becoming this child should be 
valued: However, the problem with this argument lies in determining.the degree 
of protection that the foetus deserves by virtue of its potential human status. For 
it is not a human but merely a potential human, so surely protection should not 
". See J. Eekelaar 'Does a Mother have Legal Duties to her Unborn Child?' in Peter Byrne 
(ed.) Health. Rights and Resources: King's College Studies L987-8 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 55. Eekelaar advocates that tr>'ing to solve moral issues by recourse to definitions 
in this way are best avoided: "Definitions are descriptions of factual phenomena; their 
applicability in the present context is, as a matter of language, uncertain. They cannot in 
themselves resolve the moral issues of how people should behave." at 58. 
'". 'Respect for Life: Embryonic Considerations' in D.R. Bromham, M.E. Dalton, J.C. Jackson 
and P.J. Millican Ethics in Reproductive Medicine (London: Springer-Verlag Ltd., 1992), 47. 
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be as great as the protection owed to a fully fledged human. For example 
Tristram Engelhardt says: 
, " I f ' X ' has potential 'Y ' , it follows that ' X ' is not ' Y ' and does not 
have the properties of ' Y ' ... I f ' X ' has potential to be President, he 
does not have all the Presidential rights."'^ 
John Harris agrees that just because a creature can become something else does 
not necessitate treating it as such prematurely.''' He points out that we will all 
die one day, but do not want to be treated as dead. Raanan Gillon is equally 
critical of this form of the argument from potential saying; 
"The crucial moral question remains: at which phases of human 
development should individuals within those phases be accorded the 
intrinsic right to life that we all agree must be accorded to individuals 
who are in the person phase of human development? And alas the 
argument from potential, in whatever version, does not ... give us an 
answer to that question..."'^ 
Some commentators within this camp believe that the argument from potential 
runs from the viability'*' of the foetus. This is because the foetus can often 
survive outside the woman from this point and is therefore not dependant upon 
her to such an extent. Patricia King believes that the foetus at viability has such 
great potential to become human that fijll human protection should run from this 
point.However, there are problems of legal certainty here, because as 
^"'.Tristram Engelhardt 'Viabilitj' and the Use of the Fetus' in Bondeson, Engelhardt, Spicker 
and Winship, Abortion and the Status of the Fetus: Philosophy and Medicine Volume 13. A 
CoUection.of Essays (New York: Reidel, 1983), 184. 
John Harris op. cit., 10. 
"Human Embrj'os and the Argument form potential' Journal of Medical Ethics 17 (1991), 
59. at 61. . ' 
Viabilit\^ is a term given to the stage when the foetus is developed enough to survive outside 
the pregnant woman, (Usually taken to mean 26 weeks gestation, though foetus' have sun'ived 
from 24 weeks). 
Patricia King The Judicial Status of the Foetus: a Proposal for the Legal Protection of the 
Unborn' (1979) 77(22) Michigan Law Review 1647. 
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technology advances, the point when a foetus becomes viable changes. Birth is 
the most logical and certain point in gestation to separate foetus from child, 
though this is not to say that protection cannot gradually increase throughout 
gestation as the foetus nears childhood. 
The foetus is a potential human, but the argument from potential fails to 
provide any concrete method by which to afford the foetus protection and for 
this reason it is criticised. However, it will be seen in the next section that the 
symbolic significance of the foetus to society is an important consideration and 
that as the foetus ages in gestation (and its potential for life comes closer to 
being realised) its symbolic significance increases. This is because the foetus 
becomes more like a baby which we recognise as deserving of human rights. It is 
for this reason that the foetus is given more protection as it nears term; not 
directly because it has potential to be human (because it would be impossible to 
say where in that potential to begin protecting the foetus, and to what degree), 
but because as the foetus grows, so does the symbolic significance society holds 
for it. In this way, the potentiality argument fails because no particular point in 
potentiality is more important than another. The same criticism does not exist 
for symbolic significance. 
The second camp in the argument from potential are of the view that only 
the fliture child has enough potential to warrant protection. This group can be 
sub-divided into those who look prospectively and. those who look 
retrospectively at the foetus. The former group believe that the foetus has no 
significant human potential as long as there exists the woman's right to abort. 
Hence Janet Radcliffe Richards proclaims that once the mother decides not to 
abort the child, the mother's autonomy can be. overridden because the foetus is 
now a definite future child. '** However, criticism, of this view is conceivable 
because it is impossible to say that a foetus is a definite fliture child, firstly 
because the decision of whether to abort is ongoing and secondly because there 
'Maternal-Fetal Conflict' in S. Bewley and R. Humphrey Ward (ed ). Ethics in Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology. (London: RCOG Press, 1994), U. 
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is always a possibility of miscarriage. Even in the Re S'^  situation, it could not be 
said with certainty that the foetus would survive the caesarean section operation. 
The latter group within this camp, however, propose that the fiiture child 
(foetus) deserves protection from a retrospective stance. In other words, rather 
than looking from the perspective of the foetus, the situation must be viewed 
from the perspective of the child. Hence it is the baby that has retrospective 
rights once it is bom and has become a person.As Engelhardt contends: 
"Potential persons have no actual rights, however the actual persons 
they become will have strong rights and claims. Therefore, actions 
harming future persons are immoral due to a casual chain that is part of 
the gestational history of the body .of that person."^' 
Because these rights are retrospective, third parties are unable to tell i f the 
foetus will later become a future person, and hence some protection is offered to 
all foe tus ' .This is especially important in the case of foetal surgery and 
treatment where the effects of the such treatment on a fiiture child will always 
have to be considered in case the foetus survives (and survival is the primary 
objective). It is this final view that will be supported (in conjunction with other 
perspectives outlined below) for the purposes of this chapter, because it does not 
make unrealistic and legally inapplicable distinctions between the various 
gestational stages of the foetus. However, the claim that the symbolic 
importance of the foetus grows as gestation continues will also be recognised. 
c) Symbolism 
The foetus is therefore protected retrospectively (by the Congenital Disabilities 
(Civil Liabilities) Act 1976. for example) out of a concern for the well-being of 
Re S (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 3 W.L.R. 806. 
See Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liabilities) Act 1976 s. 1(1). Also see Raanan Gillon 
Pregnancy, Obstetrics and the Moral Status of the Fetus' Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (1988), 
Tristram Engelhardt op. cit., 186. 
Note that there are also laws that protect the foetus regardless of its potential such as the 
Abortion Act 1967. 
the fiiture child. However, it is also protected prospectively (by the Abortion 
Act 1967. for example) because the foetus has special significance to us because 
it is human derived, Ian Kennedy recognises the flaws in the 'human-foetus' 
debate, but believes that the foetus is special, not because of its humanhood but 
because of its 'humanness'. He believes that the foetus is sufficiently human-
like to deserve special status and protection. It has the potential to become 
human but, he claims, more than this is needed. That extra factor is provided 
by virtue of the fact that there is something special, something that commands 
moral respect in human products. 
The belief that human products are special is undoubtedly correct. What 
should be done as a result of that belief and how to best respect that product, 
however, is a matter of conjecture. To what degree must the foetus be 
protected in view of its humanness? For Kennedy, the symbolism is an 
important issue; if physicians experiment on the foetus then a bad example will 
be set to the rest of society. Here the concern does not lie with issues of the 
embryo and experimentation, but Kennedy's concept can be applied to the 
foetus-pregnant woman scenario. The foetus should be protected, but its 
protection does not take precedence in all cases. Surely it would prove 
adequate, i f the foetus is not a human but is merely potentially so (with that 
added 'humanness' factor), that the foetus is protected by controlling the 
woman's right to demand treatment so leaving her right to refuse it uncurbed. 
For protection must be given to the foetus, but that protection need not equal the 
rights of an actual human. Further, as the foetus becomes more human-like, 
protection is increased out of a recognition that the symbolic significance of the 
foetus as it grows. Hence the Abortion Act 1967 prevents unlimited abortions 
See Ian Kennedy, Treat me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), 125. 
See J.E. Myers 'Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?' (1984) 24 
Duquesnc Law Review 1. See also Bonnie Steinbeck op. cit., 40. Also see the Meeker, Annas 
debate; W. Meeker 'Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients' New England Journal of 
Medicine ."517 (1987), 1224 (letter) and G:J. Annas 'Letter to the Editor' New England Journal 
of Medicine 317 (1987). 1224 (letter). Also see S.L. Barron 'The Gallon Lecture for 1992: The 
Changing Status of the Foetus' S.L. Barron and D.F. Roberts (eds.) Issues in Fetal Medicine. 
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Symposium of the Gallon Institute 1992 (London and New 
York: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), pp. 1-24 for the increasing symbolic significance of the 
foetus. 
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partly out of a concern for the symbolic affect on society caused by the killing of 
a humanly derived organism, and as the foetus nears term, protection is 
increased. However limited abortions are legalised in order to protect the 
autonomy of the woman and prevent back-street abortions. 
Therefore three arguments for the protection of the foetus have been accepted 
based on; the retrospective value of the fiature child; the prospective value of the 
foetus which is human derived and special to us; and the symbolic effect on 
society of treatment or lack of treatment of the foetus. 
What Protection do the Foetus and the Pregnant Woman 
Deserve? 
A framework now exists whereby the woman can refiise intervention, but 
cannot necessarily demand it, and whereas her interest is of primary concern in 
the former case, the state interest is of primary concern in the latter. Defining the 
state interest involves devolving the best possible goal for the greatest number 
of people; a broad utilitarian concept. Though the 'best possible goal' is 
impossible to accurately define, it is here advocated that a possible goal in this 
case is 'health'. Hence, though individual autonomy is of primary importance in 
the refusal of treatment, when defining what an individual can demand, the best 
possible health of those involved in the scenario, is a worthy governmental goal. 
This will include a consideration of both the health of the foetus and the woman, 
for the governmental concern is paramount here (whereas with the right to refiase 
treatment the pregnant woman's concern is paramount) and so both foetus and 
pregnant woman will be of importance to the government.The woman is 
important to the, government because of her human status, and the foetus is 
important because of its potential to be human, its human origins and its 
symbolic significance. 
Note that just because the foetus' and pregnant woman's health are considered sidc-by-sidc 
here, does not make foetus and woman of equal status, for the pregnant wonian enjoys far 
more protection by virtue of her right to refuse medical intervention. It will also be shown that 
as health is a value laden concept, the maternal health will include a degree of mental well-
being which the foetus cannot possibly claim for it is not sentient. 
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This section firstly determines an acceptable definition of health, and 
secondly briefly examines the 'Four Principles' in order to clarify the wider 
meaning of health. Following this abortion, foetal surgery and screening are 
examined in an attempt to apply the principles. In conclusion three different 
types of treatment are differentiated and the corollaries that flow from each for 
woman and foetus are elucidated. 
a) Is Health the Best Goal? 
First, it is important to define health. Following this the value of the goal is 
considered. Good health may refer to physical well-being, to mental well-being, 
social well-being or to all three. Edwards and Graber consider the definition 
of 'health' (and the often opposing definition of 'disease'), and propose that one 
possible definition of health is 'the normal, natural fijnctioning of the body and or 
the mind' .However, Edwards and Graber oppose this, for the mere fact that 
statistically few exemplify a trait (for example beauty or extreme height) does not 
necessarily make them ill. They also point out that i f an illness were to become 
common, it would not make it healthy. In fact, though the concepts of health 
and disease have a descriptive content they are also value laden: 
"... the general concepts of disease requires descriptive differentiating 
criteria and that all particular disease concepts incorporate descriptive 
clinical causes, conditions, signs, and / or symptoms. Medical 
education pays almost exclusive attention to the empirical dimensions 
of disease and tend to ignore or forget the disvalues." '^' 
On this definition both the pregnant woman and the foetus can suffer illhealth 
depending on the prevalent societal values. 
Hence it can be seen that health is value laden; it is subjective and 
moveable, but is laced with a descriptive content. Edwards and Graber provide 
some of the 'disvalues' of disease which gives the concept a content. Using these 
they limit the term disease to areas in which the physician has province. This 
seems the correct solution, for though the potency of social problems is 
Edwards and Graber Bioethics (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988), 
246. (As exemplified by Christopher Boorse, Leon Lass and Thomas Szasz). 
"'. Edwards and Graber op. cit., 248. 
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recognisable, placing them in the 'disease' bracket merely confuses the roles of 
physicians. The terms they use to give content to 'disease' are dysfunction, 
distress, deformities and premature death.~^ However, health involves more than 
the mere absence of diseases; it involves a wider sense of well-being. For this 
reason it will take more to accomplish the health of the pregnant woman than it 
will to accomplish the health of the foetus. This is because the foetus is likely to 
be construed as unhealthy or diseased only where there is medical evidence of 
disease, for it is unable to have, recognise or communicate feelings of mental 
distress. 
It is in the interest of the pregnant woman's health to allow certain 
concessions in her right to demand treatment, for health is not merely the 
absence of disease, but a more general well-being. This includes both treatment 
that may harm the foetus (though her access to this must be limited) and 
treatment that will benefit the foetus, for the latter is usually her desire. 
However, the value of health to the foetus will depend on the rationale from 
vyhich it is viewed that the foetus deserves protection. For example the 
proponents of the argument from potential who recognised that the foetus must 
be retrospectively protected would presumably care little about the health of the 
foetus provided that it is born alive and healthy. Those who wish to give the 
foetus prospective protection, on the other hand, would be keen to see that no 
pain is suffered by the foetus during the gestational period. Those who argue 
that the foetus is human-derived and deserves protection because of the symbolic 
significance on society would presumably wish for foetal health both 
prospectively and retrospectively. Since the value of all three perspectives has 
been acknowledged, it seems acceptable to say that the value in foetal heahh 
exists both prospectively and retrospectively. However, the health of the foetus 
in the womb is limited by its lack of sentience (and often its lack of sensitivity to 
pain), therefore its health once born will usually be the primary consideration. 
'Dysfunction' refers to an under or over presence of a desirable mental or physical capacity. 
They give examples of blindness, deafness, and heart failure. Medical help is called for here. 
'Distress' refers to physical or mental distress or pain. E.xamples given are cancer, 
appendicitis, depression and paranoia. Again, it is appropriate to seek medical advice and help 
here. 'Deformities' may be dis\'ales. Hence if alopecia, or dwarfism cause mental distress then 
tliey are within the province of the physician. 'Premature death' way be a disA'alue, for we use 
advice and treatment from the physician in order to tr\' to prevent it. 
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All that remains is to balance the value of foetal health with the value of the 
pregnant woman's health. One possible aid to equilibrium is the 'Four 
Principles'. 
Because health is partly descriptive, but also value-laden, it'is important 
to uncover the basis of the values. Boyd, with this purpose in mind, refers to 
the famous 'Four Principles'. These include beneficence, non-maleficence, 
respect for autonomy and justice. 'Beneficence' and 'non-meleficence' require 
the physician to consider the clinical aspects of the case; to assess the physical 
and mental requirements and suggest any alternatives to the patients preferred 
course. 'Respect for autonomy' means that the doctor must have good reason 
for refusing to allow the patient's self-determination. Justice is the final principle 
which is all encompassing, involving the balancing of considerations in the 
individual case.^ " 
Hence autonomy of the pregnant woman is still an important issue even 
when considering her right to demand treatment, however it must exist 
alongside the societal interest in foetal health. The justice consideration is also 
important to ensure that the pregnant woman is not disadvantaged by virtue of 
her pregnancy. Any treatment that a normal woman would be given should not 
be withheld fi"om the pregnant woman, though she should be warned of the risks 
of any treatment that is harmfiil to the foetus. Though at present this leaves little 
scope for governmental refiisal of the pregnant woman's requests on behalf of 
the foetus, two important factors must be noted. The first is that the foetal and 
maternal health rarely come into opposition at present. The second is that the 
likelihood of opposition will increase as the recent technological advances 
become common place. When this happens, the principles revealed in the thesis 
will prove extremely usefiil, for the woman's rights to alter her foetus (be it a 
in Raanan Gillon, op. cit., 814. 
The Four Principles are criticised by K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert 'Moralit\' vs. 
Principalism' in Raanan Gillon op. ciL, 25K at 261. They prefer instead rules of morality, by 
which they include: Do not kill; do not cause pain; do not disable, do not deprive of freedom; 
and do not deprive of pleasure. Morality also comprises the following five rules which cause 
harm if ignored; do not deceive; do not break your promise; do not cheat; do not break the law; 
and do not neglect your duly. 
78 
change in it's cosmetic appearance, sex or intellect for example) can be 
legitimately limited in the interests of the future child, the foetus and the society 
for whom the foetus has such symbolic significance. Further, though the 
principle offers some legal certainty, it is sufficiently liquid to alter with 
technological advances. 
b) The Effect on Medical Procedures 
It is useflil at this stage to examine the effect that this interpretation of the status 
of the foetus has on the medical procedures (specifically abortion, screening and 
foetal surgery) open to the pregnant woman. 
The Maternity Services Government Response to the Second Report from 
the Health Committee, Session 1991-1992 on Maternity Services, affirms the 
importance of health in the wider sense in which it has been proposed, saying: " 
... The key factor is the outcome: a well baby and a healthy, happy mother."'' 
It has been noted that the woman's right to demand treatment (including 
abortion) can, and must, be limited. It is suggested that the present abortion 
laws largely accord to this principle,^^ so by affording a measure of protection to 
the foetus, but preserving the woman's autonomy by occasionally allowing her 
to rid of an unwanted child. It also protects other aspects of the woman's well-
being, reducing the incidence of back-street abortions and giving precedence to 
the pregnant woman's life over that of the foetus. However, i f this seems too 
much of a concession to the pregnant woman (in view of the fact that this is the 
London HMSO Cm. 2018, Part 1, Par. 1.4. 
32 Though Ruth Hubbard, 'Eugenics: New Tools, Old Ideas', in Holfhian Baruch, A. 
D'Adamo, J. Seager (eds.) Embryos. Ethics and Women's Rights (New York and London: 
Harrington Park Press, 1988), 225 (Hereafter Hoffman Baruch) legitimately argues that due to 
the symbolic importance of the foetus, abortion on the grounds of handicap alone (s.l(l)(d)) is 
unacceptable because of its eugenic connotations. In this thesis a distinction has been made 
between treatments which the woman refuses (which she is able to refuse absolutely) and 
treatments which the woman demands (which should take into consideration factors other than 
the woman's autonomy though not completely ignoring that factor). Abortion comes under the 
latter category and therefore the woman's autonomy must be considered alongside the welfare 
of the foetus. It has been noted that refusing abortion altogether would create an undesirable 
situation of back-street abortions, however it would be possible to omit the eugenic aspect of 
the Abortion Act leaving the woman able to abort should her health suffer as a result of 
continued pregnane)', even if her health suffers directly as a result of the handicap of the child. 
In effect her freedom would be altered minimally, but the bad symbolic effect of the eugenic 
section would be reduced. 
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main source of foetal protection), then John Eekelaar's views show the wisdom 
of the concessions to the pregnant woman/'" Eekelaar starts from the premise 
that the foetus is no morally different to a. child, and though this does not 
necessarily accord with the views represented in this thesis it illustrates how 
abortion can be justified even when the foetus is elevated to the position of 
human. 
Eekelaar contends that, fi-om a moral objective, there is no distinction 
between the foetus and the child. Therefore, as the child cannot expect its 
mother to put herself in a life-threatening position (or even at risk of serious 
psychological disturbance) for his sake, neither should the foetus (nor the state 
on behalf of the foetus). Abortion is permissible only due to the physical 
inseparability of the mother and foetus: "Only by abortion can the mother be 
protected from undergoing conditions a parent would not be expected to 
tolerate. Nature, not social ordering, has made it so."""* In this way it can be 
seen that limited abortion rights for the pregnant woman are justifiable. 
Foetal screening has multiple purposes: It can be used to diagnose illness in a 
foetus with a view to its treatment, or alternately with a view to its termination: 
It can be used to determine the sex or other characteristics of the foetus, either 
with a view to parental preparation for the child, or with a view to its 
termination should it fail to reach the standards set by the parents, or possibly 
with a view to correction of the defect by foetal surgery . Therefore, though the 
Eekelaar op. cit., 55-76. "... no single stage of embryonic evolution, after its commencement 
at fertilisation, seems in itself capable of generating a moral conclusion. I feel compelled to 
adopt the position that, if a fetus has rights, it always has them; if it has not I am not 
convinced how or at what point they are acquired." at 57. 
Eekelaar, op. ciL, 61. Note that Eekelaar does not use this model to justify any abortion; 
only to justify conditions that a parent would not be expected to tolerate: there must be 
commensurability between the act and the threat to the woman. 
See generally A. Sutton Prenatal Diagnosis: Confronting the Ethical Issues (London; The 
Linacre Centre for the Study of the Ethics of Health Care, 1990) and more specifically M. 
Richards and J. Green 'Screening for Foetal and Genetic Disease: Some Social and 
Psychological Consequences' in Ian Robinson (ed.) Life and Death Under High Technolog\' 
Medicine (London: Manchester University Press, 1994), p36-48. 
For the specific techniques involved see A. Sutton op. cil.. 19 and Caroline Whilbcck "Fetal 
Imaging and Fetal Monitoring: Finding the Issues' in E. Hoffman Bamch op. cit., 47. 
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woman has the opportunity of ultrasound screening, the more complicated 
screening techniques, such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling are 
reserved for cases with a higher risk of abnormality largely because the risks to 
the foetus are considered too great to justify the procedure."^ It should also be 
noted that though screening is often aimed at detection of abnormalities with a 
view to termination, it can conversely prevent unnecessary abortions where the 
risk of handicap is great but proves to have been avoided in a particular case. 
Foetal surgery'* is a recent technique that is not yet technologically advanced 
enough to become commonplace. It is prudent, however to ensure firstly that 
when it does so, the law is sufficiently advanced to protect women from forced 
surgery and secondly to limit women's recourse to it on the grounds that the 
risks to the foetus is occasionally unacceptable. On 14th February 1995, BBC2's 
'Horizon' episode 'Twice Bom' researched the recent advances in foetal surgery 
around the world. They reported the wonderful ways in which the technique can 
be used to save or treat the foetus and the way in which scarring can be 
eliminated. However, there are few laws or properly researched ethical codes 
governing foetal surgery and there are areas of concern. Though Michael 
Harrison and his pioneering team at California University were said to operate 
only if the foetus could not survive without the operation,, others such as Doctor 
Monenterro of the University of Mexico were said to have operated on less dire 
cases, for cosmetic effect. Horizon quoted the case of a lady who visited Doctor 
Monenterro for the correction of the foetus' cleft lip (with the benefits of healing 
without scar tissue). This particular lady considered the cleft lip to constitute 
37 
David Heyd in 'Prenatal Diagnosis; Whose Right?' Journal of Medical Ethics. 21 (1995), 
292 says that of the four possible groups towards which prenatal screening should be aimed 
(the parents, the child, society or no one), a balance between the parents needs and society's 
needs is called for. 
For techniques and justifications of foetal surgery see D.K. Nakayama Toetal Surgen,'' and 
M.J. White Toetal Surgen.'' in S.L. Barron and D.F. Roberts (eds.) op. cit., 94, 105. See also 
W.R. Barcley, R.A. McCormick, J.B. Sidbury, M. Michejda and G.D. Hodgen The Ethics of 
In Ulero Surger\'' Journal of American Medical Association. 246 (1981), 1550 and Francois 
Luks Toetal Surgcr>': New Techniques Have Given Surgeons a Second Chance' British 
Medical Journal. .Ill"(Dec. 1995), 1449. 
such a handicap, that she would have aborted the foetus had the technique not 
been available. There is concern as to whether the precedent set by such an 
operation which is both expensive and extremely risky to the foetus, is 
acceptable. While the technique is uncertain it would be prudent to reserve 
foetal surgery for cases where the foetus would otherwise miscarry. This would 
accord with the conclusions that have been drawn concerning the protection 
deserved by the foetus, and it would also alleviate a possibly damaging symbolic 
effect on society. Further, it would represent the best chance for the foetus to 
attain health (both in the womb and, more importantly, once bom). 
As the technique advances, it will prove necessary to review the degree of 
intervention granted to the pregnant woman, but this must be done under the 
guiding principle that the foetus is deserved of protection by virtue of its 
potentiality, its value to society and the symbolic effect any treatment or lack of 
treatment will have on society. One possible solution, as Alexander Capron 
suggests, is the setting up of a national commission on medical ethics to 
deliberate the issues as the technologies advance.^ ^ 
Hence the balance between woman as foetal container and foetus as mere 
appendage can realistically be appreciated on the basis of allowing the woman 
complete autonomy to refiase intervention with her body, but curbing her rights 
to demand such treatment. 
Conclusion 
Hence, the law must protect the foetus for the sake of the pregnant woman and 
her well-being; for the sake of the fijture child; for the sake of the foetus itself; 
and for the sake of society whose views on the subject must not go unheeded. 
When defining how far to heed a pregnant woman's demand for treatment, her 
autonomy must be recognised as valuable and worth protecting, especially if her 
'A National Commission on Medical Ethics?' in P. Byrne (ed.) op. cit., 177. Capron 
describes the work of the American President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research and concludes that a similar 
Commission would be useful in Britain. 
82 
'health' will suffer as a result of non-compliance and especially i f the foetal 
health will not be harmed as a result of her action. 
In effect a distinction has been made between various types of treatment. 
It is concluded that treatment that is entirely separate from the pregnancy must 
be forthcoming to the pregnant woman in the same way as every other citizen 
can expect the treatment. This is because justice is one of the components of 
health which was viewed a valuable goal. Hence a pregnant woman who suffers 
from cancer should not be refused treatment on the grounds that her foetus 
would suffer or die. 
The second category concerns treatment of the foetus, such as screening 
and foetal surgery. Here the components of the pregnant woman's health must 
be considered; her autonomy and the justice principle still have bearing, but the 
foetal interest in health must also be considered. Hence foetal surgery, for 
example, must be available to the woman (provided that resources are available) 
but must be limited to occasions when the benefit to the foetus is likely to 
outweigh the traumas of the surgery. 
The third category concerns treatment relating to the pregnancy that is 
designed to help the pregnant woman. The most obvious example here is 
abortion. Here the interests of foetus and pregnant woman must again be 
balanced. The woman has some interest in equality with other women (in other 
words in being free to rid of the foetus is she so desires) but the prospective 
value of the foetus and its symbolic importance (that increases with gestation) 
necessitates limitation of abortion as is evidenced in the law as it stands. 
With the aid of a medical ethics committee to review criteria as technology 
advances, it is hoped that the conclusions outlined in this thesis could prevent 
the trampling of the pregnant woman's rights, and offer protection to the foetus 
in an ordered and logical manner. 
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